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INTRODUCTION 
Through the entrapment defense, the law acknowledges that 
criminal behavior is not always the result of a culpable mind, but is 
sometimes the result of an interaction between the individual and his 
environment. By limiting the amount of pressure and temptation that 
undercover agents may bring to bear on a target, the defense 
recognizes that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen can be persuaded, 
cajoled, or intimidated into criminal activity that, he would never 
* Many thanks to Professor Phoebe Ellsworth for her comments on an earlier draft. 
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consider absent law-enforcement interference. Appropriate 
application of the defense requires, however, that courts be able to 
accurately separate the truly wicked from the merely weak-willed, and 
offensively coercive police conduct from that which merely convinces 
the criminal-minded to commit the crime here and now where he can 
more easily be caught. Two methods of making these distinctions have 
evolved: the subjective and objective tests. 
In 1932, the Supreme Court first recognized the defense of 
entrapment in Sorrells v. United States,1 creating what has since come 
to be known as the "subjective test." The test has two elements: 
inducement and predisposition. The defendant must first provide 
evidence that the government induced him into committing the crime.2 
The inducement element focuses on the egregiousness of the pressure 
that the government brought to bear on the defendant. Although the 
degree of pressure required to establish inducement varies somewhat 
between courts, the element is generally satisfied where the police 
created a situation that posed a substantial risk that a hypothetical 
"ordinary law-abiding person" might be tempted to break the law.3 
The Seventh Circuit has characterized the test for inducement as 
"whether the police employed tactics calculated to overcome the 
reluctance of a law-abiding citizen."4 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit 
describes inducement as government action that "'created a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other 
than one ready to commit it. "'5 Because it emphasizes the reaction of 
an ordinary or reasonable citizen to police-created temptation, 
inducement is an objective inquiry.6 
Once the defendant presents some evidence that the government 
did more than merely provide an opportunity to commit the crime -
that is, offered some extra incentive for it - the burden shifts to the 
prosecution to rebut the defense by either proving beyond a 
1. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. 
R yan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11 th Cir. 2002). 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing 
inducement as "the sorts of promises that would blind the ordinary person to his legal 
duties" ); United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491 , 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
inducement occurs when the government created a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by someone "'other than one ready to commit it"'); United States v. Kell y, 748 
F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Indu cement focuses on whether the government' s  conduct 
could have caused an undisposed person to commit a crime."); United States v. Dickens, 524 
F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing inducement as when '"the Government' s  condu ct 
created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one 
ready to commit it"' ); PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 60 (3d ed. 200 2). 
4. Evans, 924 F.2d at 717. 
5.  Andrews, 765 F.2d at 1499 (quoting Dickens, 524 F.2d at 444). 
6. Kelly, 748 F.2d at 698. 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the 
crime or that he was not induced.7 The predisposition element shifts 
the focus from how the police conduct would influence the ordinary 
person to whether this particular defendant would have committed an 
offense of the type charged in the absence of police inducement.8 If 
the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, the defense fails. 
Accordingly, predisposition reduces to a question of "but-for" 
causation, looking to whether the defendant would have committed a 
crime but for the police pressure.9 Making this determination requires 
a prediction of how the defendant would have behaved had the police 
left him alone.10 
The two elements thereby serve competing ends. The inducement 
inquiry, by requiring the prediction of an ordinary person's behavior 
with police pressure, binds police tactics within a range that will not 
cause ordinary citizens to break the law. The predisposition inquiry, 
by allowing conviction notwithstanding the degree of inducement, 
prevents the would-be criminal from escaping liability for a crime that 
would likely have happened in any event. It therefore requires 
predicting this defendant's behavior without police pressure.1 1  
7. See, e.g., United States v .  Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 200 3). 
8. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 63; Christopher D. Moore, Comment, The Elusive 
Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. R EV. 1151,  1164 (1995) (arguing that 
the Court's current position on predisposition asks "whether the defendant would have 
committed the crime absent government involvement" ). 
9. See Sorrell s  v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1932) (stating that entrapment 
prevents the punishment of a defendant "for the commission of an offense of the li ke of 
which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would have 
been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired . . .  him to attempt to commit it" ); 
United States v. Manzell a, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) ("As a defense to a criminal 
prosecution ' entrapment' means the government's inducing a person to commit a crime who 
was not predisposed to commit it - in other words, who would not have committed it but 
for the particular inducement that the government held out." ); MARCUS, supra note 3, at 63; 
John D. Lombardo, Comment, Causation and "Objective" Entrapment: Toward a 
Culpability-Centered Approach, 43 UCLA L. R EV. 20 9, 235 (1995). 
10. See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1 196, 120 1-0 2 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane ). 
In Hollingsworth, the court found entrapment as a matter of law where, despite his 
willingness when given the opportunity to launder money, the defendant lacked 
predisposition to commit the charged offense because, without the government' s  assistance, 
he never would have had the opportunity to do so. Id. at 120 2  ("(The defendants] had no 
prayer of becoming launderers without the government' s aid." ). 
1 1. See Phillip Mullock, The Logic of Entrapment, 46 U. PITI . L. REV. 739, 745 (1985) 
("(T]o say that (the defendant] is disposed (to violate the statute] is to say that if a suitable 
opportunity presents itself, (the defendant] will probably [violate the statute]." ). Others have 
erroneously claimed that a defendant is predisposed so long as under some circumstance he 
was willing to commit the crime. See R onald J. Al len et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40 7, 413 (1999) (arguing that predisposition, as applied by some 
courts, is "an ex istential fallacy" because everyone has a price at which they will commit a 
crime); Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense, 73 VA. L. R EV. 10 11 ,  10 40 (1987) (making the same argument). This reading of 
predisposition is circular. The jury knows the defendant has a price because they know he 
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Many states have rejected the subjective test and adopted what has 
become known as the "objective test."12 The objective test forgoes any 
inquiry into the defendant's predisposition, and merely asks whether 
the police conduct posed a substantial risk that the crime would be 
committed by someone otherwise not ready to do so.13 This focus on 
police conduct is essentially the inducement inquiry of the subjective 
test.14 Some states also require that the defendant prove a causal 
connection between the improper police conduct and the commission 
of the crime.15 While the subjective test almost always leaves the 
question of entrapment to the jury, in most states employing the 
objective test, the question is exclusively for the judge.16 
Although accurate statistical evidence of the frequency with which 
the entrapment defense succeeds is difficult to come by, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that it is seldom successful. One survey of practicing 
criminal defense attorneys described it as "judicially unpopular,"17 best 
used only "in desperate circumstances,"18 or "in a few cases with ideal 
commi tted the offense. The relevant question is what is the defendant's price in relation to 
the unmanipulated world? Because entrapment is concerned with preventing the police fr om 
manufactur ing crime that would not otherwise occur, the best reading of the doctrine is that 
the predisposed is one who would have committed the crime under the ordinary 
circumstances of his daily life. The predisposed is, ther efore, not one who would commit the 
crime in ex change for some extraordinarily high price, but one who would do so when 
provided with the incentives available in his ordinary environment. 
12. Because the entrapment defense is based on a presumed congressional intent that 
criminal statutes were not meant to reach acts instigated by the government, state courts are 
free to adopt other versions of the defe nse in interpreting their own state law. See Sherman 
v. Uni ted States, 356 U.S. 369, 379- 82 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrell s v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 446- 5 1  (1932). 
13. State v. Agrabante, 830 P.2d 492, 499 (Haw. 1992);Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 
229 (Alaska 1969}; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985). 
14. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985) (describing the obj ective test for 
entrapment as when a police officer induces the defendant by "employing methods of 
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial r isk that [the] offense will be committed 
by persons other than those who are ready to commit it" ), with United States v. Andrews, 
765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding that inducement occurs under the subj ective 
test when the government created a substantial r isk that the offense would be committed by 
someone "other than one ready to commit it" ), and sources cited supra note 3.  
15.  See ,  e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v.  Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 961 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1982) (holding that the obj ective defense of entrapment was not available where the 
inducement did not cause the defendant' s  crime); People v. Barker, 293 N.W.2d 787, 788 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980 )  ("Defendant's selling of stolen property occurred after the breaking 
and entering for which he was charged. Thus, it cannot rationally be argued that the 
subsequent police conduct caused defendant's prior offense. Defendant was not charged 
with any offenses arising out of the police sale, therefore, there was no possible 
entrapment."), rev'd on other grounds, 30 6 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. 1981); see also Lombardo, 
supra note 9, at 238-40 . 
16. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 247; e.g., State v. Valdez-Molina, 897 P.2d 993, 995 (Idaho 
1995); People v. D'Angelo, 257 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1977); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 
230 (Alaska 1969} .  
17. Ben A. Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 165, 189 ( 1974). 
18. Id. at 165. 
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facts," where "plea bargaining has proved unsuccessful, "19 and "no 
other defense is possible."20 Another survey of State's Attorneys in 
Chicago reveals a perception that in narcotics sales cases where the 
defendant pleads entrapment, "the jury will convict almost every 
time. "21 The author of one police manual on the execution of sting 
operations states that he has "never, in hundreds of cases, ever lost 
one to entrapment," and that in all the sting operations he has studied, 
he has "not heard of a single case being lost to a defense of 
entrapment. "22 
Absent information concerning how frequently the entrapment 
defense should be successful, statistics on how often it is successful 
provide little guidance. If we are confident that the police are not 
placing undue pressure on the targets of sting operations, then the 
defense should seldom succeed. But one study of police training 
manuals finds that they contain no "significant discussions of 
[entrapment]. "23 The discussion that does exist is lacking in meaningful 
advice to the practicing police officer.24 This dearth of meaningful 
training on entrapment, the authors conclude, is because the concept 
is not a significant limitation on police practices.25 
Two explanations for the defense's ineffectiveness have been 
widely offered. First, for entrapment to be credibly argued, the 
criminal act must be admitted.26 While a defendant can, in theory, both 
deny committing the criminal act and plead entrapment, such a 
strategy destroys the defendant's credibility.27 Even when the police 
admit actions that are plausibly inducing, a defendant may elect to 
forgo pleading entrapment and instead deny committing the offense. 
Second, the subjective form of the defense invites the prosecution to 
introduce a variety of evidence relevant to the defendant's 
predisposition such as his criminal record; prior bad acts, including 
uncharged crimes; and reputation testimony, which would otherwise 
19. Id. at 165. 
20. Id. at 165, 189. 
21. David P. Bancroft, Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and Doctrine 
of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 162 (1963); see also Roger Park, 
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 267 n.339 (1976) (describing an 
informal survey of Minnesota criminal attorneys and their experience with the entrapment 
defense). 
22. STEVEN K. FRAZIER, THE STING BOOK 137 (1994). 
23. LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 211  (1976). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. Members of a vice squad of the Chicago Police Department informed the authors 
that entrapment was "not treated formally or informally as a problem of concern." Id. at 
211 n.18. 
26. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 67 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
27. Id. 
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be excluded as propensity evidence.28 The introduction of this, 
evidence is often criticized because it invites the jury to convict based 
on the defendant's bad character or uncharged bad acts, even if they 
are not convinced that he was predisposed to commit the offense.29 
This Note argues that there is another reason entrapment claims 
seldom succeed: the entrapment defense requires that factfinders 
make causal and predictive determinations that human beings are 
unable to make with accuracy, and the inherent inaccuracy works to 
the defendant's disadvantage. The entrapment defense suffers from 
what has been called "the fundamental attribution error" - a 
pervasive bias to see people as causal agents in their environment.30 
Studies in social psychology demonstrate that people consistently 
overestimate the role of dispositions and underestimate the role of the 
situation when making predictions about what a particular defendant 
or an ordinary person would do in a given situation - the sorts of 
inquiries that an entrapment defense requires. Compounding the 
problem, people consistently overestimate the accuracy with which 
they can make these sorts of predictions, thereby depriving the 
defendant of the benefit of the reasonable doubt. The effect of these 
inaccuracies is to consistently impair the efficacy of the defense.31 
This Note relies on studies in social psychology to argue that the 
ineffectiveness of the entrapment defense can be explained by 
commonly held cognitive biases that sway the jury toward conviction. 
Part I argues that the fundamental attribution error biases the 
factfinding in entrapment cases against the defendant. Studies in social 
psychology reveal that factfinders do a consistently poor job of 
determining what types of situations are inducing, that they are prone 
to infer dispositions from manifestly situational behavior, and are 
consistently overconfident in their ability to make such findings 
accurately. Part II proposes several methods for mitigating the effects 
28. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404( a) ( "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion . . . .  "), with Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 ( 1932) ( " [I]f the 
defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate 
and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue."). 
See generally W.H. Johnson, III, Note, Proving a Criminal Predisposition: Separating the 
Unwary Innocent from the Unwary Criminal, 43 DUKE L .J. 384 ( 1993). 
29. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 ( 1958) ( Franklin, J., concurring). 
30. See generally LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE 
SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ( 1991) ( discussing the fundamental 
attribution error). 
31. For an interesting argument that the fundamental attribution error has produced a 
systemic tendency within the substantive criminal law to find criminal culpability when harm 
occurs, see Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the 
Social Psychology of Blame , 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 ( 2003). This Note, however, takes a less 
novel approach, ex amining solely the fundamental attribution error's effect on factfi nding, 
and not how it has shaped legal doctrine. 
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of the fundamental attribution error: improving jury instructions, 
adopting the objective test for entrapment as a jury question, and 
increasing police and judicial sensitivity toward the use of channel 
factors32 in sting operations. 
I. ATIRIBUTION THEORY & ENTRAPMENT 
Implicit in both the entrapment defense and classic attribution 
theory is the understanding that behavior is produced by a 
combination of an individual's personal characteristics {his 
disposition) and his environment (the situation). All of an individual's 
actions fall along a causal spectrum. On one end lie those actions that 
are completely situational - under the circumstances, anybody would 
have behaved the same way.33 At the other lie those actions that, 
under the circumstances, differ from those that most people would 
take under the same circumstances. We attribute this deviation from 
the norm to the unique disposition of the actor.34 Relative to the 
ordinary man, the actor had a "preference for" or a "disposition 
toward" the particular act. 
Determining where on this causal spectrum any one person's 
particular action lies is a highly inaccurate task. Social psychology 
teaches that the attribution of causality between situation and 
disposition is biased by the fundamental attribution error, which 
results in causal attributions that lean excessively toward the 
dispositional end of the spectrum.35 In other words, "in a social setting 
in which either a person or some situational variable is a plausible 
causal candidate for an outcome, there exists a general bias to see 
people as causal agents, particularly their enduring dispositional 
32. A channel factor is a very small situational difference that produces surprisingly 
large changes in behavior. See discussion infra Part I, Section D. 
33. See Harold H. Kelley , Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, in 15 NEBRASKA 
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION, 192, 208-09 (David Levine ed., 1967) ("[T]he action yields 
information about the actor's idiosyncratic intentions only insofar as the effects are not those 
that people in general would have produced under similar circumstances. "); Richard E. 
Nisbett & Eugene Borgida, Attribution and the Psychology of Prediction, 32 J. PERSONALITY 
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 932, 932 (1975) ("[T]he stimulus rather than the actor will be seen as the 
chief cause . . .  when most people respond to the entity in the same way the actor does. "). 
34. See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. 
EXPERIMENT AL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1967). 
35. See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES 
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist 
and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); Edward E. Jones 
& Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of 
Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 79 (Edward E. Jones 
et al. eds. , 1971); Edward E. Jones, The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions, 34 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1979). 
766 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:759 
attributes."36 This is not to say that disposition is not a determinant of 
behavior, but merely that it is often less so than is commonly believed. 
The fundamental attribution error has two components: First, people 
have an inflated belief in the importance of individual character 
differences and dispositions.37 Second, they underestimate the degree 
to which situational factors influence behavior.38 
The fundamental attribution error poses a particular threat to the 
entrapment defense because the defense requires the factfinder to 
separate the situational and dispositional causes of behavior. Section 
I.A argues that factfinders have a difficult time determining when an 
ordinary person would be tempted by a sting operation. Determining 
whether a situation is inducing requires predicting how the ordinary 
person would respond to the police sting. Numerous studies suggest, 
however, that people consistently underestimate how easily behavior 
can be manipulated by situational factors. 
Section I.B argues that a factfinder may have similar difficulty in 
determining whether a defendant is predisposed to a particular crime. 
This element of the defense requires the factfinder to consider a 
variety of character evidence and determine whether the defendant 
was the sort of person who was likely to commit the offense anyway. 
This is akin to predicting the likelihood that the defendant would 
commit the crime even if he had never wandered into the police sting 
operation. Studies suggest, however, that even when given reliable 
character evidence, people do a very poor job of predicting how others 
will behave. 
Section l.C contends that the fundamental attribution error 
produces overly confident factual findings in entrapment cases. 
Factfinders are more confident in their ability to identify dispositions 
and predict how the ordinary person will respond to a particular 
situation than their performance warrants. This overconfidence works 
to the defendant's disadvantage by depriving him of the benefit of the 
reasonable doubt. 
Finally, Section l.D discusses the use of channel factors in sting 
operations. Social psychology provides a variety of methods of 
designing sting operations that have the tendency to produce drastic 
changes in behavior through subtle situational manipulation. Those 
manipulations that are particularly difficult for factfinders to account 
36. Shelley E. Taylor, The A vailability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192-93 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For further discussion and an historical background of the 
fundamental attribution error, see Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The 
Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21 (1995). 
37. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1991). 
38. Id. 
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for are "channel factors,'' and pose a particular threat to the 
entrapment defense. 
A. Discounting the Situation and the Difficulty in Determining What 
Is "Inducement" 
When the factfinder is required to determine whether the 
defendant was induced into committing a crime, it must decide 
whether the police created a situation that would potentially cause a 
law-abiding citizen to break the law.39 This exercise is really a form of 
prediction: the factfinder imagines a hypothetical reasonable person 
and predicts how he would respond to a given police inducement. 
Studies in social psychology demonstrate, however, that subjects often 
highly underestimate the degree to which the ordinary person's 
behavior can be altered by subtle situational manipulations.40 This 
substantially decreases the likelihood that a judge or jury will find that 
police pressure was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to deviate 
from his ordinary law-abiding ways. Instead, because it has excessively 
discounted situational factors as causes for the crime, the factfinder is 
overly likely to attribute the crime in question to a criminal disposition 
possessed by the defendant. 
In a groundbreaking study, John Darley and Daniel Batson 
explored the degree to which personal disposition and situational 
factors determine behavior through an experimental-recreation of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan.41 The subjects of the experiment were 
Princeton University theological seminary students.42 In the first stage, 
each subject was given a questionnaire to complete regarding the 
reasons for their decision to attend the seminary.43 Specifically, the 
39. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
40. See, e.g., Walter Mischel & Philip K. Peake, Beyond Deja Vu in the Search for Cross­
Situational Consistency, 89 PSYCHOL. REV. 730 , 730 (1982) ("[C]ompelling intuitive evidence 
supports the enduring conviction that people are characterized by broad dispositions 
revealed in extensive cross-situational consistency. "). 
41. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of 
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 100 (1973). The parable of the Good Samaritan is as follows: 
"And who is my neighbor?" Jesus replied, "A man was going down from Jerusalem to 
Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving 
him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down the road; and when he saw him he 
passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, 
passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was; and 
when he saw him, he had compassion, and went to him and bound his wounds .. . .  Which of 
these three, do you think, proved neighbor to him who fell among the robbers?" 
Luke 10:29-36 (RSV). 
42. Darley & Batson, supra note 41, at 102. 
43. Id. 
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researchers requested that the subject identify a dispositional trait that 
best explained the motivation for his religious training.44 In Stage II, 
each subject was individually instructed to prepare a short talk to be 
presented in a nearby building.45 After being given directions to the 
building, one-third of the subjects were told, "'Oh, you're late. They 
were expecting you a few minutes ago. . . . [Y]ou'd better hurry;"' 
another third were told, "'[They're] ready for you, so please go right 
over;"' and the last third were told, '"It'll be a few minutes before 
they're ready for you, but you might as well head on over."'46 On the 
way, while passing through an alley, the participants encountered a 
man slumped in a doorway, coughing and groaning.47 The subjects 
were given scores according to how much assistance, if any, they 
offered to the apparently sick man.48 
Darley and Batson discovered that they could manipulate how 
most seminarians reacted to the sick man by varying the degree of 
time-pressure they were under. While 63 percent of early seminarians, 
and 45 percent of the on-time seminarians stopped to help, only 10 
percent of the late seminarians were helpful.49 The dispositional 
variable - the nature of the participant's religious orientation - had 
no statistically significant effect.50 Because most seminarians did not 
help when they were hurried, but few did when hurried, Darley and 
Batson were able to "induce" either helpful or unhelpful behavior by 
altering the situational manipulation. 
Observers of the Good Samaritan experiment were not, however, 
able to easily perceive the true causes of the seminarians' behavior. 
Expanding on the Good Samaritan study, Paula Pietromonaco and 
Richard Nisbett provided half of their subjects with a copy of Darley 
and Batson's results to read.51 The researchers then asked all of the 
subjects to make predictions about helping behavior in two 
situations.52 One situation, very similar to the Good Samaritan study, 
44. Id. at 103. The three possible motivations for their training were: a) a means to 
another end such as salvation; b) religion as an end in itself; or c) religion as a quest for 
meaning in the world. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 103-04. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 105. 
50. Id. at 106 ("No correlation between the various measures of religiosity and [the 
occurrence of helping behavior] ever came near statistical significance . . . .  "). 
51. Paula R. Pietromonaco & Richard E. Nisbett, Swimming Upstream Against the 
Fundamental Attribution Error: Subjects' Weak Generalizations from the Darley and Batson 
Study, 10 SOC. BEHA V. & PERSONALITY l, 2 (1982). 
52. Id. 
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involved a woman with an injury requesting assistance.53 The second 
was a pregnant woman whose car had broken down.54 Each subject 
then estimated the likelihood that the average member of the target 
population would help.55 Before answering, those who had received 
the Good Samaritan study were asked to recall and consider it.56 
The subjects demonstrated a poor grasp of what causes a person to 
help another. For those subjects who had not read the Good 
Samaritan study, the estimates regarding which seminarians would 
help were virtually the opposite of reality. Uninformed subjects 
believed that being in a hurry would have virtually no effect on the 
decision, and predicted that about 80 percent of seminarians in both 
the hurried and unhurried groups would stop to help.57 The 
uninformed subjects also erroneously believed that religious 
disposition would have a pronounced effect, producing nearly an 
eighteen-percentage point difference in the proportion of seminarians 
offering help.58 The results suggest that the observers of this 
experiment are inclined to attribute helping behavior to dispositional 
qualities of the actors and not to salient situational factors. Although 
the primary determinant of helping behavior was whether or not the 
experimenters "induced" the seminarian into not helping by hurrying 
him, observers believed that this factor would be irrelevant. Instead, 
they placed great emphasis on what turned out to be the statistically 
insignificant religious disposition of the seminarian. 
This tendency is especially resilient to remedial efforts. Even those 
subjects who had read and been instructed to recall the Good 
Samaritan study fared poorly. They were no less likely to use religious 
motivation as a factor in predicting when seminarians would help than 
the uninformed subjects.59 In addition, while Darley and Batson had 
demonstrated a fifty-three percentage point difference in helping rates 
between hurried and unhurried groups, the estimates of the informed 
subjects regarding which seminarians would help only showed a 
nineteen point difference.60 The researchers concluded that "the 
failure of subjects to generalize even to a highly similar situation, 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. For example, subjects were asked, "'What percentage of the seminary students 
would help?'" or "'What percentage of New Jersey males would help?"' Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 3 tbl.1. 
58. Id. at 3. 
59. Id. ("No interaction effects were obtained between the effect of being informed and 
personality type or for any interactions including these two variables. Thus, informed 
subjects continued to use the personality variable for predictions and were not significantly 
less inclined to do so than uninformed subjects."). 
60. Id. at 3 tbl. 1. 
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despite the presence of what was surely a very strong experimental 
demand to do so, suggests that the fundamental attribution error may 
be quite resistant to the data and arguments of the social scientist."61 
Like the subjects of these studies, the factfinder in an entrapment 
case is presented with situational and dispositional data and required 
to determine the cause of a particular behavior. Factfinders must first 
determine how a reasonable person would respond to the police sting 
operation. Second, given the evidence concerning the defendant's 
character and disposition, the factfinder must decide whether the 
crime would have occurred even absent the inducement. What these 
studies suggest for the entrapment defense is that judges and juries 
may perform quite poorly at these tasks. The drastic behavioral effects 
produced by subtle situational manipulations may go unnoticed. 
Instead, factfinders may overestimate the probative value of the more 
salient propensity evidence and explain the defendant's behavior as a 
product of a criminal disposition. These studies suggest, however, that 
dispositional evidence is a much less valuable means of determining 
the cause of behavior than the average judge or jury is likely to realize. 
The results of Darley & Batson's study might plausibly be 
explained by overconfidence in the accuracy of the seminarian's self­
reported, dispositional evidence. In an entrapment case, the 
defendant's disposition will likely be proven in part through the 
testimony of character witnesses.62 One might plausibly hope that the 
opinions of others would provide a more accurate assessment of an 
actor's disposition than potentially self-serving self-reports, thereby 
improving the accuracy of predictions relying on dispositional 
evidence. The fundamental attribution error has, however, been 
demonstrated to be a robust phenomenon even when dispositional 
evidence is derived from a more objective source. 
Newton, Griffin and Ross gave two groups of subjects the chance 
to donate to a food drive.63 Subjects were ranked by their peers 
according to the likelihood that they would donate to a food drive.64 
Those voted "least likely" were placed in one group; those voted 
"most likely" in another.65 Half of the subjects in each group were sent 
both a letter personally addressed to them requesting that they donate 
and a map showing the location of the collection box, and they 
61. Id. at 4. 
62. Thomas J. Reed, The Character Evidence Defense: Acquittal Based on Good 
Character, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345, 392-93 (1997). 
63. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 132-33 (describing E. Newton et al., Actual 
Versus Estimated Impact of Person and Situation in Determining Pro-Social Behavior 
(1988) (unpublished Manuscript, on file with Stanford University). 
64. Id. at 132. 
65. Id. 
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received follow-up phone call reminding them to donate.66 The other 
half of each group was merely given a form letter addressed to "Dear 
Student," requesting that they donate.67 
The peers who had nominated each subject to his "least likely" or 
"most likely" group were then asked to predict whether the subject 
would donate, given the situational group he was placed in.68 The 
nominators strongly believed that the disposition of the subject would 
be predictive of donation, but that the situational group he was placed 
in would be largely irrelevant.69 Specifically, they estimated that a vast 
majority of the "most likely" contributors, but only a small minority of 
the "least likely" contributors, would donate.70 These predictions did 
not substantially vary depending on whether the subject would receive 
a map, phone call, and personalized letter, or merely a form letter.71 
It was, however, the situation that proved a stronger determinant 
of behavior than a person's perceived disposition to donate. None of 
the "least likely" subjects and only 8 percent of the "most likelies" 
who received only the form letter donated to the drive,72 but 25 
percent of the "least likelies" and 42 percent of the "most likelies" 
donated when they received the map, personalized letter, and follow­
up phone call.73 While the study revealed that both disposition and 
situation are important factors in predicting a person's behavior, the 
situational variable, at least in this instance, proved more important 
than any character trait salient to his peers.74 
Even when given character evidence provided by the actor's peers, 
subjects in the donation study performed poorly at determining when 
a peer would be "induced" into donating and when he would do so 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 133. 
69. Id. 
70. The nominat ors predicted likelihoods of 83% for t hose who received t he phone call, 
personalized letter, and map, and an 80% likelihood for t hose t hat received only the form 
letter. Id. The subject s  predict ed t hat t he "least likely" contribut ors would have a 17% 
likelihood of donat ing when t hey received t he map, personalized letter, and follow-up phone 
call, and a 16% likelihood of donat ing where t hey only received t he form letter. Id. 
Id. 
71. See id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Ross and Nisbett concluded: 
The evidence, in fact , is consistent with an extreme version of t he fundament al att ribut ion 
error. Peop le readily make trait ascript ions from data that permit only a situat ional 
interp ret at ion or, at most , t he interp retat ion t hat t hat the actor behaves in a p art icular way 
in a part icular type of situat ion. These trait ascriptions are t hen used as the basis for yet 
further p redict ions, which, again are characterized by litt le attent ion to situat ional factors. 
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due to his own disposition. Predictors were able to somewhat separate 
those of their peers who had donating disposition from those who did 
not, but they overestimated the role that disposition would have in 
their peer's decision. Similarly, predictors weakly perceived that 
receiving a personalized letter, phone call, and map were situational 
variables that would have some effect on the likelihood of donation, 
but they vastly underestimated their role in the experiment's outcome. 
Extrapolating from studies of helping behavior to the realm of 
crime prevention is, of course, fraught with uncertainty. While it may 
be fairly easy to induce an ordinary person into donating to a can 
drive, producing the sort of antisocial theft and drug offenses typically 
targeted by sting operations may not be as easy. It may seem that 
criminal activity is so beyond the realm of an ordinary person's typical 
behavior that the sort of subtle situational manipulations that had such 
drastic effects in these studies would be ineffectual at instigating 
crime. Instead, the more that crime deviates from the person's 
ordinary behavior, the more drastic and obvious the inducement might 
have to be. 
As intuitive as this argument may be, one of the most famous 
studies in social psychology, Stanley Milgram's Behavioral Study of 
Obedience, refutes it.75 Milgram's subjects were instructed that they 
were participating in a study of memory and learning.76 They were 
partnered with one of Milgram's accomplices, masquerading as 
another subject.77 In what appeared to be a random manner, subjects 
were assigned to the role of teacher, and accomplices to the role of 
learner.78 Accomplice and subject were taken to a room where the 
learner was strapped into an electric chair.79 The teacher was then 
taken to the shock generator in an adjoining room connected via an 
intercom.80 The teacher was instructed to ask the learner a series of 
memory questions.81 Each time the learner answered one incorrectly, 
the teacher was to press a button to administer a shock and then turn a 
dial to increase the voltage for the next wrong answer.82 Once the 
75. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) [hereinafter Milgram, Behavioral Study]; see a/so STANLEY MILGRAM, 
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974) (hereinafter MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY]; 
Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUM. 
REL. 57 (1965) [hereinafter Milgram, Some Conditions]. 
76. Milgram , Behavioral Study, supra note 75, at 372. 
77. Id. at 373. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. At this point, the teacher was given a 45 volt sample shock to convince him of the 
authenticity of the experiment. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 373-74. 
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shock reached the level of 300 volts, the learner began to bang on the 
adjoining wall.s3 The pounding was repeated after a 315 volt shock was 
administered, and the learner ceased to respond either to questions or 
further shocks after that.84 If the teacher continued asking questions, 
the learner ceased to respond, and the teacher was instructed to treat 
no answer as a wrong answer.s5 The experiment ended either when the 
teacher refused to continue or when he administered the maximum 
shock of 450 volts, two steps beyond the level labeled "Danger: Severe 
Shock."s6 
Milgram sought to discover what portion of teachers would call a 
halt to the experiment and refuse to continue administering shocks to 
a non-responsive learner. The results of the study were startling. Only 
one in eight subjects refused to continue administering shocks after 
the learner began banging on the wall,s7 and in total, 35 percent at 
some time refused to continue shocks.ss But 65 percent never refused 
to comply, administering ten more shocks of increasing intensity after 
the learner began banging on the wall and eight more shocks after he 
stopped responding at all.s9 With few exceptions, the teachers believed 
the shocks they administered were real and painful.90 Many fully 
obedient teachers orally protested, but continued with the experiment 
when the researcher accepted responsibility and instructed them to 
continue.91 
Anticipating that the results might be counterintuitive, Milgram 
measured the difference between commonly expected obedience and 
actual obedience. Prior to conducting the experiment, Milgram 
83. Id. at 374. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. at 372, 376. 
87. Id. at 375. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. The maximum shock that these subjects administered was two notches beyond 
where the dial was labeled "Danger: Severe Shock." Id. at 376. 
90. Id. at 375. 
91. See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 153-68; Milgram, 
Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 67. Milgram repeated the study several more times under 
different conditions. See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75; Milgram, 
Some Conditions, supra note 75. In one variation, Milgram placed the learner in the same 
room as the teacher. Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 62. In this version, the 
learner would only receive a shock if his hand was pressed against a metal plate on the arm 
of the electric chair. Id. At the 150-volt level, the learner demanded to be let free and 
refused to place his hand on the shock-plate. Id. The experimenter ordered the teacher to 
force the learner's hand onto the plate and administer the remaining shocks. At 300 volts the 
learner refused to answer any more questions and insisted he was no longer a willing 
participant. Id. at 60. Even under these conditions, 30 percent of the teachers completed the 
entire experiment. Id. at 62. 
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distributed a description of the proposed study and a questionnaire to 
fourteen Yale senior psychology majors.92 They were asked to reflect 
on the study and predict the behavior of 100 hypothetical teachers.93 
All fourteen senior psychology students agreed that only a small 
minority of teachers would continue to the maximum level of shock.94 
The estimates ranged only from 0 percent to 3 percent.95 Milgram 
posed the same question to his colleagues, and "the most general 
feeling was that few if any subjects would go beyond the designation 
Very Strong Shock."96 The prediction of forty psychiatrists surveyed 
by Milgram was that only 3.73 percent of teachers would continue 
after the learner began pounding on the wall, and a mere one-tenth of 
1 percent of subjects would administer the maximum level of shock.97 
Milgram's experiment suggests that most ordinary, reasonable 
people can be induced into committing acts that, had circumstances 
been as the subjects believed, would be criminal. Moreover, Milgram 
was able to induce this behavior through situational manipulations 
that few professional psychologists and psychology students -
presumably a group well-equipped to identify inducement - could 
accurately evaluate. Clearly, however, Milgram's teachers were 
induced into shocking the learner. The experiment went beyond 
posing a substantial risk that an ordinary person would administer the 
series of shocks; it produced a situation in which nearly two-thirds did! 
Assuming for the moment that Milgram was a government agent and 
the teacher was charged with an offense related to the shocks, no jury 
could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that there was 
no inducement. Yet the predictions of Milgram's colleagues and 
students suggest that hardly any judge or jury would find that such a 
defendant was induced. Instead, most courts would likely hold that the 
experimental design failed to do more than merely provide an 
"opportunity" to commit the offense and is therefore insufficient to 
even raise the issue of entrapment.98 





97. Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 72-73 & fig.3. 
98. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) ("It is well settled that the fact 
that officers or employees of the government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the 
commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. "). 
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B. Inferring Disposition from Situational Behavior and the Difficulty 
in Determining Who ls "Predisposed" 
The flipside of the propensity to underestimate the role that 
situational variables play in determining behavior is that when 
behavior is observed, the observer is too likely to infer that the actor 
possesses a corresponding character trait.99 When people 
underestimate the power of situations, they will be prone to make 
unwarranted dispositional inferences about actors who violate the 
erroneous expectations that such underestimates create.100 Observers 
also fail to properly utilize knowledge of base rates - the proportion 
of other people who behaved similarly - when making their 
dispositional attributions.101 Observers are not substantially less likely 
to infer character traits from a person's behavior when they know that 
most or all other people behaved similarly in the same situation.102 
This phenomenon may undermine the factfinder's ability to 
accurately determine the predisposition of the defendant in an 
entrapment case. First, a factfinder may be excessively prone to infer 
that the entrapped defendant was predisposed to commit the crime 
based on his induced commission of the offense. Second, the factfinder 
is likely to undervalue evidence that, given the degree of inducement, 
most other people would also have committed the offense. 
1. Inferring Predisposition from Commission of the Offense 
Studies in social psychology and about the fundamental attribution 
error confirm a long-suspected pitfall of the entrapment defense: 
factfinders may infer that the defendant was predisposed to commit 
the offense merely from the fact that he did so in response to the 
police inducement.103 The fact that he committed the crime is often the 
99. Jones, supra note 35, at 113-16 (discussing the overattribution effect). 
100. See generally Melvin Snyder & Edward E. Jones, Attitude Attribution When 
Behavior ls Constrained, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 585 (1974) (providing 
evidence that people tend to make dispositional attributions to explain behavior, 
underestimating the role of environmental constraints). 
101. See generally Nisbett & Borgida, supra note 33 (arguing that subjects do not make 
use of base-rate information in making predictions). 
102 Id. 
103. See Bennett L .  Gershman, Abscam, The Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 
YALE L .J. 1565, 1581 (1982); Hardy, su; ra note 17 at 187 ("[O]ne of the most common 
methods of proving a defendant's predisposition is by showing his ready complaisance to 
commit the crime or, in effect, the speed and ease with which he complies with an agent's or 
informant's request. ") Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous 
Government Conduct Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 305, 329-30 (1996) ("Juries may infer 
predisposition simply from a defendant's acceptance of government inducements. "); 
Mullock, supra note 11, at 750 ("[I]f we ask, 'why did he do it?' the answer is, 'because he 
was predisposed to do it;' and if we ask, 'why was he predisposed to do it?' the answer is, 
'because he did it. "'). While a defendant can, in theory, both deny committing the crime and 
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most obvious piece of evidence concerning the sort of person the 
defendant is, and some courts have found this sufficient evidence from 
which a jury can find predisposition.104 Commission of the offense in 
the face of police inducement is, however, exceedingly minimal 
evidence of predisposition, given that predisposition is a measure of 
how the defendant would behave in the absence of police inducement. 
The circularity of this evidentiary bootstrapping is obvious when 
identified, but studies suggest that it may nonetheless tempt 
factfinders. The danger that the factfinder will be seduced by such a 
pernicious argument is magnified by the fundamental attribution 
error. In other words, to the same extent that the factfinder discounts 
the situational factors in the inducement inquiry, it is likely to 
overestimate the degree that the defendant's disposition played in his 
offense.105 
Richard Nisbett provided some of the clearest evidence of the 
propensity to excessively infer dispositional traits from manifestly 
situational behavior. Nisbett arranged to have some observer-subjects 
("the observers") watch other actor-subjects ("the actors") participate 
in what they were told was a study on decisionmaking.106 The 
observers watched as an experimenter announced to the actors 
awaiting the start of the experiment, "Before we get started, though, I 
happen to have sort of a real decision for you to make."107 He told 
them that volunteers were needed to provide campus tours to 
potential donors to the University on the upcoming weekend.108 If the 
actor was willing to volunteer, she would be paid for her time. One 
group of observers watched actors who were offered $0.50 an hour, 
argue that he was entrapped, Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), this strategy is 
rarely employed because the implication of inconsistency destroys the defendant's 
credibility. See id. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
104. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1429 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding the 
district court's conclusion that a jury could find that the defendant was predisposed to 
commit the alleged crime because she committed the crime); United States v. Jannotti, 673 
F.2d 578, 598-99 (3d Cir. 1982) (allowing jury to infer a politician's predisposition to accept 
bribes from his ready acceptance of the bribe in question); Maestas v. United States, 341 
F.2d 493, 495 (10th Cir. 1965) (permitting a jury to find predisposition to sell narcotics from 
willingness to sell to undercover agent); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1242 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("It is not unfair to permit a jury to infer a defendant's mental state, his 
predisposition, from the manner in which he responds to [the inducement]."). 
105. Consider, for example, the statement of Abscam informant Mel Weinberg that '"a 
guy's either a crook or he isn't. If he ain't a crook, he ain't gonna do anything illegal no 
matter what I offer him or tell him to do."' GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE 
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 120 (1988) (quoting Mel Weinberg). 
106. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Behavior as Seen by the Actor and as Seen by the 
Observer, 27 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 154 (1973); see also Jones & Nisbett, supra 
note 35 (discussing the study). 
107. Nisbett et al., supra note 106, at 156. 
108. Id. 
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while another group of observers watched actors who were offered 
$1.50 an hour.109 Only one-quarter of those offered $0.50 volunteered, 
while two-thirds of those offered the higher wage accepted.110 As 
economic theory would predict, the wage, a situational factor, was a 
good predictor of whether the employment offer would be accepted. 
Both the actors and the observers were later asked to predict the 
likelihood that the actor would volunteer to help another charitable 
group, the United Fund, for free.111 Actors themselves did not think 
they were more likely to help the United Fund if they were volunteers 
than if they were nonvolunteers.112 Observers, however, believed that 
if the actor had previously volunteered to give campus tours, she was 
much more likely to volunteer to help the United Fund than those 
who had not volunteered.113 
Given that subjects were randomly assigned to the $0.50 or $1.50 
group, there is little reason to think one group was more predisposed 
to volunteering. In making their predictions, however, observers of the 
high-volunteering, highly paid group judged them as generally being 
more likely to volunteer in the future than did the observers of the 
low-volunteering, poorly paid group.114 Observers apparently assumed 
that the actor's decision to volunteer reflected a predisposition to 
volunteer rather than the influence of the payment offered.115 When 
the actors were asked to explain why they accepted the offers, 
however, they were more likely to explain their behavior in terms of 
the amount of money they were offered,116 suggesting that people are 
much better at appreciating the situational causes of their own 
behavior than those of others. 
The only factor distinguishing those who accepted the off er and 
those who did not was whether they were offered the higher or the 
lower amount of money - i.e. the degree to which they were induced 
to volunteer.117 But by predicting that actors would volunteer under 
less compelling circumstances, observers revealed that they largely 
109. Id. Adjusted for inflation, these figures would be approximately $2.07 and $6.22 in 
2003 dollars. See Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, at http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/ 
inflateCPI.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). 




114. Id. at 157 tbl.l. 
115. Id. at 157. 
116. Id. ("It therefore appears that observers are inclined to make dispositional 
inferences from behavior under circumstances in which actors infer nothing about their 
general inclinations. "). 
117. See id. at 157 tbl.l. 
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attributed the decision to volunteer to whether or not the actor had a 
volunteering disposition, and not the wage that he was offered.118 A 
jury confronted with a defendant pleading entrapment is similarly 
situated. The jury knows of an action - the crime - and a situation 
the actor was in - the inducement. If the conclusions of the Nisbett 
study hold true, the factfinder may infer a criminal predisposition from 
the induced crime. 
Observers are also likely to infer an actor's disposition even when 
the actor is given no choice about his conduct. In a 1967 study, Edward 
Jones and Victor Harris asked subjects to read essays that either 
attacked or defended Castro's Cuba.119 One-half of the subjects were 
told that the author of the piece had been assigned a particular 
position to advocate for in a debate, with no choice on the author's 
part.120 The other half were told that the author made his own choice 
of whether the essay would be pro- or anti-Castro.121 The subjects were 
then asked to estimate the author's actual opinion of Castro.122 Those 
who were told that the authors were given a choice largely believed, as 
expected, that those who wrote pro-Castro essays were truly pro­
Castro and vice versa.123 
The assessments of those readers who were told that the author of 
their essay was given no choice, however, were quite surprising. Given 
that the subjects were told that the author was randomly assigned the 
editorial position for which he advocated, one would expect 
approximately similar attitudinal assessments of both pro- and anti­
Castro authors. The editorial position of the essay, in other words, was 
irrelevant to the author's actual beliefs. Despite knowing that the 
authors had no choice concerning the position for which they 
advocated, this group of subjects judged the pro-Castro writers to be 
more pro-Castro than the anti-Castro writers.124 The subjects gave 
substantial weight to the "face-value" meaning of the act of writing the 
118. Id. at 157 ("It may be seen . . .  that the actor's behavior prompted the observers to 
make dispositional inferences. "). 
119. Jones & Harris, supra note 34. 
120. Jones and Harris explained the instructions to the subject concerning the essay as 
follows: 
The essay was presented as the first draft of an opening statement in a college debate . . . .  
We assumed that the subjects would realize that debaters often try to defend positions in 
which they do not believe . . . .  The choice-no choice manipulation was delivered orally: the 
debater had either been directed by the team advisor to argue a specified side of the topic or 
was given his choice of sides. 
Id. at 8. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 4. 
123. Id. at 6 tbl.l. 
124. Id. 
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essay, severely failing to discount its implications in light of the 
obvious situational constraint.125 
The study suggests that even when a person has been assigned or 
coerced into a particular behavior, that behavior will be seen as 
indicative of his particular disposition.126 The readers of the essay 
knew that the writers had no choice about the editorial position of 
their essays - the writers were perfectly constrained. Despite 
knowing this, the subjects still believed that the editorial position of 
the essay was indicative of the authors' beliefs.127 Extrapolated into a 
courtroom setting, this suggests that even when the government 
inducement is so great as to leave no room for a person not to commit 
a crime, a jury is still likely to view the commission of the crime as 
probative of a criminal disposition. 
2. Failure to Apply Knowledge of Base Rates 
A postulate of classic attribution theory holds that causal 
explanations for an actor's behavior are or should be influenced by 
consensus information, i.e., information concerning how other people 
responded to a similar situationY8 Situational factors are perceived as 
the primary cause of behavior when most people behave similarly, 
while the actor's unique disposition or preference is perceived as the 
cause when his behavior is unique.129 Accordingly, we should expect 
that when a particular actor's behavior was the modal response to a 
particular inducement, that behavior is not highly probative of his 
disposition. A substantial amount of research has demonstrated, 
125. Id. at 22 ("[Subjects] give substantial weight to the intrinsic or 'face value' meaning 
of the act itself in their attributions of attitude. This is true even when the act occurs in a no 
choice context."). 
126. Jones and Harris observed: 
[C]orrespondence in attributing underlying attitudes to account for expressed opinions is 
high when the opinions are unexpected and expressed in a context of free choice. However, 
the content and direction of the opinions exert a clear inference on attribution even when 
choice is drastically reduced. In a context that permits the target person some very minimal 
degree of spontaneity, the perceiver seems to view his performance as more informative 
than a rational analysis of act and context would suggest. 
Id. at 23. 
127. Id. at 22. Follow-up studies have confirmed and elaborated on Jones and Harris's 
experiment. In one interesting formulation, experimenters asked subjects to rate how useful 
they found the essay in judging the writer's attitudes. Even those subjects who described the 
essay as "not useful" found the essay strongly probative of the writer's attitude. Arthur 
Miller et al., The Perceived Value of Constrained Behavior: Pressures Toward Biased 
Inference in the Attitude Attribution Paradigm, 47 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 160, 164 (1984). Other 
studies confirm that subjects make the same inferences when they read essays actually 
written by naive subjects assigned to a particular position. Snyder & Jones, supra note 100. 
128. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 33, at 208-09. 
129. Id. 
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however, that knowledge of consensus information produces very 
weak effects on causal attributions.130 
In one study demonstrating this phenomenon, researchers 
described Milgram's obedience experiment to their subjectsY1 One­
half of the subjects were also told the results - that 65 percent of 
teachers administered the highest level of shock - while the other 
half were not.132 Both sets of subjects were then asked to rate various 
teachers who did or did not administer the maximum level of shock on 
a variety of character traits.133 Subjects in both groups rated teachers 
who administered all of the shocks as weaker, colder, maladjusted, 
unattractive, unlikable, and more dependent than those who did not.134 
Data suggesting that obedience was largely induced had little 
bearing on the subjects' dispositional evaluations of the teachers.135 
Those subjects who knew that a majority of teachers completed the 
experiment did not substantially differ in the personality ratings they 
assigned.136 Logically, being aware of this high base rate of obedience 
should decrease the correspondence between the act of shocking and a 
sadistic or aggressive disposition. In other words, if one knows that 
two-thirds of people behave in the same unexpected manner, one 
should be less prone to attribute dispositions as causes for such acts 
than if one assumes the behavior was aberrational.137 But the results 
130. See, e.g., Nisbett & Borgida, supra note 33; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971). 
131. Arthur G. Miller et al., Perception of Obedience to Authority, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 81ST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 127, 
127-28 (1972) [hereinafter Miller et al., Perception]; see also Arthur G. Miller et al., The 
Prediction and Perception of Obedience to Authority, 42 J. PERSONALITY 23 (1974) 
[hereinafter Miller et al., Prediction]. 
132. Miller et al., Perception, supra note 131, at 127. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 127-28. Milgram similarly noted: 
Many people, not knowing much about the experiment, claim that subjects who go to the 
end of the board are sadistic. Nothing could be more foolish as an overall characterization of 
these persons. It is like saying that a person thrown into a swift-flowing stream is necessarily 
a fast swimmer, or that he has great stamina because he moves so rapidly relative to the 
bank. The context of action must always be considered. 
Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 72-73. 
135. Miller et al., Perception, supra note 131, at 127; see also Martin A. Safer, Attributing 
Evil to the Subject, Not the Situation: Student Reaction to Mi/gram 's Film on Obedience, 6 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 205, 208 (1980) (suggesting that knowledge of the 
results of Milgram's experiment causes people to overestimate the aggressive characteristics 
of people generally). 
136. Miller et al., Perception, supra note 131, at 127. 
137. Professor Arthur Miller has noted: 
(B]eing aware of this relatively high base rate of obedience should decrease the 
correspondence between the act of shocking the learner (particularly high shock) and 
personality and dispositions pertinent to such activity. Stated differently, if one knows that 
65 percent of a sample of individuals perform in a somewhat unexpected manner, one should 
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suggest that knowledge that a particular behavior was the modal 
response to a situation will not substantially attenuate an observer's 
dispositional attributions.138 
Although a factfinder contemplating an entrapment defense would 
seldom be presented with evidence of what portion of the population 
would commit the charged offense given the police pressure, 
insensitivity to consensus information is relevant to the entrapment 
defense for two reasons. First, it confirms that the factfinder is not 
likely to make causal attributions or findings of predisposition in a 
manner that the scientist would describe as rational. Second, it 
suggests the robustness of observers' willingness to infer 
predisposition from situational behavior. The abstract, pallid nature of 
consensus information is unable to remedy the biased inferences 
produced by the more vivid, concrete commission of the offense. 
C. Overconfidence and Reasonable Doubt 
Determining inducement and predisposition is a difficult task, 
hampered by cognitive limitation. Were they aware of their own 
limitations, factfinders could mitigate the impact of these deficiencies 
by decreasing the confidence with which they make these findings, but 
research into the fundamental attribution error suggests that people 
are systematically overconfident in predicting others' behavior. 
Because the predisposition inquiry requires predicting whether the 
defendant was likely to commit the offense absent police pressure, 
factfinders are likely to be overconfident in making such findings. This 
overconfidence works peculiarly to the disadvantage of the defendant 
because it is he who is intended to enjoy the benefit of the reasonable 
doubt on the issue of entrapment.139 
be less prone to attribute personality dispositions as causes for such acts than if one assumes 
the behavior to be much less probable. 
Miller et al., Prediction, supra note 131, at 39. Milgram similarly observed: 
A commonly offered explanation is that those who shocked the victim at the most severe 
level were monsters, the sadistic fringe of society. But if one considers that almost two-thirds 
of the participants fall into the category of "obedient" subjects, and that they represented 
ordinary people . . .  the argument becomes very shaky. 
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 5. 
138. For further discussion of insensitivity to base rates in making predictions, see 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 
237 (1973); Nisbett & Borgida, supra note 33; and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
139. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) ("Where the 
Government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at 
issue . . .  the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government 
agents."). 
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David Dunning, Lee Ross, Dale Griffin, and James Milojkoovic 
demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of studies.140 Each study 
required a subject to predict the response of a peer to various 
situations along with a "confidence estimate" that gauged the subject's 
belief that his prediction would hold true.141 The amount of 
information the predictor had depended on which study he took part 
in, ranging from merely viewing a photograph of the actor to having 
been the actor's roommate.142 The actor whose behavior was to be 
predicted was given a series of hypothetical situations and questions, 
and instructed to choose one of two potential responses.143 
The predictors consistently failed to achieve accuracy 
commensurate with their confidence levels.144 In each version of the 
study, a clear majority of the subjects gave overconfident estimates. 
That is, average confidence estimates exceeded their average 
accuracy.145 Subjects displayed overconfidence for 80% to 92% of the 
total predictions given.146 
The studies also demonstrated that increases in confidence outpace 
increases in accuracy.147 The more confident a predictor was in an 
individual judgment, the more overconfident he was likely to be.148 As 
a result, highly confident predictions tended to be highly 
overconfident predictions.149 
140. David Dunning et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1990). 
141. Id. at 570. 
142 Id. at 570-72. 
143. Id. at 570. For example, if the actor found money on the floor, would he keep it or 
tum it in to the lost and found? Id. Other predictions included the target's choice of 
magazine subscriptions between Playboy and the New York Review of Books, their 
customary mode of studying for an exam (studying alone v. study group), and the self-rated 
quality of their lecture notes (neat v. messy). Id. 
144. Id. at 572. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. "Overconfidence" is defined as the subjects' mean confidence estimate minus 
their mean accuracy. Id. For example, average confidence for predictions based on an 
interview or long-standing contact with a roommate ranged from 75% to 78% across the five 
studies, but average accuracy for those predictions was merely 60% to 68%. Id. 
147. Low-confidence predictions were correct just over 50% of the time, medium­
confidence predictions were correct about two-thirds of the time, and high-confidence 
predictions were correct about three-quarters of the time. Id. at 573. An accurate prediction 
was associated with a confidence rating of about 75%, and an inaccurate prediction with a 
confidence rating of 72%. Id. 
148. Id. at 574. 
149. Id. Predictions made with a low degree of confidence were on average 
overconfident by about six percentage points, and predictions made with a high degree of 
confidence were about fourteen to twenty-seven percentage points overconfident. See id. at 
574 tbl.2. "High confidence " predictions were defined as a confidence rating of 90% or 
greater. Id. 
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Dunning and his colleagues offered two relevant explanations for 
overconfidence. First, virtually all of the overconfidence was due to 
against-base-rate predictions - that is subjects predicted the actor 
would behave differently from the modal response of his peers.150 
Indeed, the more pervasive the modal response, the more 
overconfident were predictions that the actor would deviate from it.151 
The researchers' second explanation for overconfident behavioral 
prediction is that it results from overconfident situational construals.152 
Predicting an actor or the average person's behavior in a given 
situation requires us to construe or even construct the incomplete 
situational data on which we rely. Dunning and his colleagues suggest, 
however, that predictors fail to adequately discount their confidence 
in their predictions when data concerning situational variables are 
uncertain. Instead, predictors typically generate a single construal 
when presented with limited data concerning an ambiguous situation, 
and then proceed to make predictions as if that construal 
corresponded to perfect knowledge.153 The result is overconfident 
predictions and trait assessments. 
In a follow up study, Dunning and his colleagues demonstrated the 
effect of construal processes on overconfident predictions.154 Subjects 
were read a short description of a person's behavior in a given 
situation: Peter, a sophomore at Stanford, participated in a seventy­
five minute, four-person discussion on abortion, during which he 
spoke for forty-five minutes.155 The subjects were then asked to give an 
estimate of what portion of Stanford students would speak more than 
Peter in a similar group discussion, and provide a 50 % confidence 
interval around this estimate.156 They then assessed Peter according to 
three attributes: how opinionated, outgoing, and domineering he was 
relative to his peers; and they similarly provided confidence intervals 
for those traits.157 
The subjects were subdivided into four groups. The first was the 
"control group." Its members were merely given a chance to rethink 
150. Id. at 576. 
151. Id. at 577. 
152 Id. at 579; see also Dale W. Griffin et al., The Role of Construal Processes in 
Overconfident Predictions About the Self and Others, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
1128 (1990). 
153. Griffin et al., supra note 152, at 1138. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 1136. 
156. Id. A 50% confidence interval corresponds to a range of times within which the 
subject believed the average Stanford student's speaking time would fall with 50% 
likelihood. 
157. Id. 
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and alter their estimates as they saw fit.158 The second was the 
"uncertain construal group." Its members were asked to write a short 
essay describing how they construed the situation that Peter was in; 
and then, after they were finished, to provide a new set of trait 
assessment and confidence intervals.159 The third was the "certain 
construal group," and its members were similarly instructed to write 
an essay about how they construed Peter's situation. Before remaking 
their assessments, however, the certain construal group was told to 
assume that the situation possessed the exact characteristics they just 
described in their essays.160 Finally, the fourth group was the "multiple 
construal group." Its members were instructed to write multiple essays 
about various ways the situation could have appeared, and were then 
asked to reassess their estimates.161 Judgments about both what 
portion of Stanford students would speak for a similar length of time 
and what character traits Peter possessed varied widely, reflecting the 
multiple reasonable construals of the ambiguous description of the 
group discussion. 162 
Subjects in the control, uncertain, and certain construal groups all 
offered essentially the same sized confidence intervals before and after 
receiving their relevant construal instructions.163 The researchers 
hypothesized that members of all three groups initially adopted a 
particular construal of Peter's situation and made their estimates 
accordingly .164 
When the certain construal group was instructed to assume that 
their initial construal was in fact the correct one - to assume, in other 
words, that they now had perfect information about the situation -
one would expect confidence to increase and the confidence interval 
to narrow. This was not the case. The addition of perfect information 
about the situational variables Peter was faced with had no significant 
effect on the certain construal group's confidence.165 
158. Id. 
1 59. Id. 
160. Id. at 1 131 ,  1136. 
161. Id. at 1 136. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 1138 ("These results support the more general contention that people 
typically generate a single construal of an ambiguous or incompletely specified situation and 
then, unless powerfully prompted to do otherwise, make relevant assessments and 
predictions as if their situational construals correspond to perfect knowledge. "). 
165. Id. at 1 136 ("Subjects in the certain construal condition, like subjects in the control 
and uncertain construal conditions, offered essentially the same size confidence intervals 
before and after receiving the relevant construal instructions."). 
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The only group whose confidence interval changed from one 
estimation to the next was the multiple-construal group.166 Members of 
that group were forced to brainstorm and consider reasonable 
situational construals other than their initial assessment.167 When 
presented with the vagueness of their knowledge of the actual 
situation Peter faced, the multiple-construal group decreased their 
certainty in their estimations and widened their confidence intervals.168 
Only by making the situational ambiguity highly salient, by requiring 
subjects to generate alternate situational construals, was 
overconfidence reduced.169 
The researchers found that overconfidence in situational 
construals also produced extreme dispositional attributions.170 
Logically, uncertainty about the situation that produced Peter's 
behavior, especially given that his behavior seemed extreme, should 
produce a higher degree of conservatism in making trait inferences 
based solely on that single instance of behavior.171 When an actor's 
response seems extreme, we can either infer that the actor's response 
was indicative of his particular disposition, or we can assume that we 
166. Id. at 1 136. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. The researchers concluded: 
We suggest that no matter how well one knows the particular individual - even if the 
individual to be predicted is the self - one will often be guilty of erroneous predictions if 
one fails to anticipate correctly -.... hat the details of the "situation" in question will actually be 
like and how the situation will be subjectively experienced. One will be guilty of 
overconfidence, furthermore, if one fails to recognize that such objective details and 
subjective representations matter a great deal . . .  or fails to lower the subjective confidence 
of one's predictions in light of one's uncertainty about such details. 
Id. at 1 129. Professor Phoebe Ellsworth has similarly concluded: 
Several different perceivers will come up with several somewhat dissimilar accounts of a 
sequence of events. Once having arrived at a construal, or a story or explanation of the same 
sequence of events, most people find it very difficult to imagine a different way of 
interpreting the same events, and this leads them to underestimate severely their own 
creative contribution to their "memory." Even though most people recognize in principle 
that a good deal of perception is really interpretation, they are unable to make adequate 
inferential adjustments . . .  often behaving exactly as they would if their interpretation were 
the only possible one. 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Autumn 1989, at 205, 206 (citing Griffin et al., supra note 152). 
See also Robert P. Vallone et al., Overconfident Prediction of Future Actions and 
Outcomes by Self and Others, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 582 (1990) (discussing 
overconfidence in predictions of the subject's own behavior as compared to overconfidence 
in predicting the subject's roommate's behavior). 
170. Griffin et al., supra note 152, at 1 137. 
171. Id. ("[U]ncertainty about the nature of the situation that prompted or provided the 
context for a given actor's response, especially when the response seemed extreme and 
potentially 'diagnostic,' should compel a rather high degree of conservatism in making trait 
inferences about such an actor."). 
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erred in construing the situation and that the actor's behavior was not, 
after all, out of the ordinary. The more out of the ordinary the 
behavior seems, the more likely it was that our construal was 
inaccurate. 
Dunning demonstrated, however, that subjects made little 
allowance for such situational uncertainty. 172 Members of the certain 
construal group, for which there was no situational uncertainty, 
produced trait inferences no more extreme than the control or 
uncertain construal groups.173 Members of the multiple-construal 
group, however, mitigated their dispositional inferences about Peter 
after considering other reasonable construals of the situation.174 
In an entrapment case applying the subjective standard, the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
either that the defendant was predisposed or that he was not 
induced.175 Given the difficulties judges and juries have in accurately 
making the factual findings that a plea of entrapment entails, we 
would expect them to have a high level of doubt and, accordingly, a 
high rate of acquittal. Experience indicates, however, that the 
entrapment defense is rarely successful.176 Its inefficacy suggests that 
factfinders may not be accurately applying the reasonable doubt 
standard in entrapment cases. The low rate of acquittal may be 
explained by the effect of the fundamental attribution error, which can 
create overconfident causal attributions. 
· 
172. Id. 
173. Id. ("As predicted, the certain construal condition subjects showed virtually no 
increase in the extremity of their trait inferences about Peter . . .  and produced change scores 
that did not differ significantly from . . . the control and uncertain construal 
conditions . . . .  "). 
174. Id. Other studies confirm Dunning's conclusions. In one study by McGuire, 
observer-subjects were asked to predict the likelihood that actor-subjects would be helpful in 
two different situations. In the first, the actor was asked to volunteer for a psychology 
experiment, and in the second, the actor came upon a woman on crutches climbing some 
stairs whose book bag was about to slip off of her shoulder. For some of the observers, the 
subjects were unknown to them and only described to them in brief profiles; but in other 
conditions, the observers knew the actors quite well. The predictions were only slightly 
better than chance, but observers believed they would be quite accurate, especially if they 
knew the actor well. In reality, knowing the actor failed to significantly increase the accuracy 
of the observers' predictions. Observers were less accurate than they believed, and no more 
accurate when they had a great deal of knowledge about the person whose behavior they 
were trying to predict. The information they did have only served to make them 
overconfident in their prediction. Ross & NISBEIT, supra note 30, at 135 (describing A. 
McGuire, Mistaken Reliance on Individual Difference Variables in Predicting Social Behavior 
(1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); see 
also Patricia G. Devine, Overattribution Effect: The Role of Confidence and Attributional 
Complexity, 52 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 149, 154 (1989) (providing confidence data for an 
experiment in the Jones and Harris framework) .  
175. E.g. , United States v .  Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2003). 
176. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
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This overconfidence works peculiarly to the disadvantage of the 
defendant in an entrapment case. When the factfinder determines 
whether the defendant is predisposed or not, it may consider a variety 
of character evidence and based on that, predict whether or not the 
defendant was likely to commit a similar offense on his own.177 
Assuming that most people are unlikely to commit a similar offense, a 
finding of predisposition would be "against the base rate"; it would be 
a finding that the defendant is likely to behave in a way different from 
most other people. The researchers found that against-the-base-rate 
predictions for a given actor are generally the most overconfident; and 
the more deviant the predicted behavior was, the more overconfident 
the prediction was.178 Therefore, a factfinder who makes a 
determination that the defendant was predisposed is making an 
against-the-base-rate prediction and is likely to be overconfident in 
that factual finding. That overconfidence increases the likelihood that 
the judge or jury will find that predisposition was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, when a more accurate assessment of the evidence 
would reveal greater ambiguity. This effect is likely to be more 
pronounced the more unusual, and therefore more against-the-base­
rate, the crime in question is.179 
It is tempting to conclude that increased uncertainty, whether 
justified or not, is neutral, benefiting neither party, but that would 
assume that the risk of error is shared equally between the prosecution 
and the defense. Overconfidence, however, works to the advantage of 
the party who has the burden of proof. In assessing the entrapment 
defense, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed.180 Under this 
standard, the defendant should win whenever the factfinder believes 
that, more likely than not, the defendant was entrapped. The 
defendant should also win sometimes when the factfinder believes that 
the prosecution has proven that, more likely than not, the defendant 
was not entrapped, but has not met the more rigorous "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard. If the factfinder believes that, more likely 
than not, the defendant was entrapped, overconfidence has no effect. 
Regardless of whether the confidence in that decision is high or low, 
177. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text. 
179. This effect may be mitigated by the adversarial presentation of evidence. Insofar as 
this process compels the factfinder to consider both the prosecutor's and the defendant's 
interpretation of the sting operation, it requires consideration of at least two situational 
construals. 
180. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992). Placing the burden of proof on 
the prosecution to rebut the defense represents a determination that "it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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the defendant is acquitted. But when the factfinder believes as an 
initial matter that the defendant was not entrapped, overconfidence 
works to the defendant's disadvantage by effectively lowering the 
burden of proof. If, for example, the factfinder should have a 
confidence level of only 60% that the defendant was not entrapped, 
the prosecution has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.181 
If Dunning's conclusions hold true, however, the perceived confidence 
level may exceed the reasonable-doubt threshold and result in an 
erroneous conviction.182 
In sum, studies in social prediction suggest that factual findings in 
an_ entrapment case are likely to be made with a higher degree of 
confidence than the evidence warrants. Insofar as these findings are 
affected by the fundamental attribution error, not only are they more 
likely to be incorrect, but they are more likely to be overconfident. 
Overconfidence in a finding that the defendant was predisposed based 
on the commission of the crime is likely worsened to the extent that 
factfinders fail to generate and contemplate multiple construals of the 
evidence concerning the police inducement. Finally, because the 
prosecution shoulders the burden of disproving the defense of 
entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, overconfidence works to the 
defendant's disadvantage. 
D. Channel Factors Applied to Sting Operations 
Subjects have a hard time predicting the behavior of particular 
individuals or the average person in part because they underestimate 
the impact of certain situational aspects called "channel factors." A 
channel factor is a very small situational difference that produces 
surprisingly large changes in behavior.183 In the study of the Good 
Samaritan, whether the seminarian was in a hurry produced a large 
change in behavior; therefore being rushed was a channel factor.184 
181. One could set the reasonable-doubt threshold at 91 % based on Blackstone's 
famous statement that "the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than 
that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352 (photo. reprint 
1992) (1765); cf C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, 
or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1332 (1982) (reporting that in a poll 
of 167 federal judges, the mean probability assigned to "beyond a reasonable doubt" was 
90.28% ). The reasoning of the argument contained in the text is unaffected by translating 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" into a less-exacting percentage, so long as it exceeds 50%. 
182. I use the phrase "erroneous conviction" not in the sense that the defendant was 
convicted despite actually being entrapped. Rather, I use the term to mean that he was 
convicted despite a substantial probability that he was entrapped. That is, an erroneous 
conviction occurs when the prosecution did not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
183. See generally Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 46-58 (discussing channel factors). 
184. See id. at 48-49. 
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Experimenters have identified a variety of channel factors. In the 
Newton study of those most and least likely to donate to a food drive, 
receiving a map to the donation site, a personalized letter, and a 
phone call reminder were channel factors that greatly increased the 
likelihood that the recipient would donate.185 Another commonly cited 
channel factor is the presence of a model - another person 
performing the action in question.186 In subsequent experiments, 
Milgram showed that if teachers administered the learning experiment 
in a group setting and one teacher refused to continue, 90 percent of 
his fellow teachers followed suit.187 
One of the most potent channel factors, known as the "foot-in-the­
door" technique, can be convincing a subject to take a small initial 
step along a path that would lead him to take much more substantial 
action. This phenomenon was aptly demonstrated by Jonathan 
Freedman and Scott Fraser in a classic study.188 The researchers 
approached middle-class homemakers and requested that they take a 
small, innocuous step promoting a non-controversial cause, such as 
signing a petition or placing a small sticker in the corner of their car 
window supporting "safe driving."189 Two weeks later, a second 
researcher approached the homemakers, and also a control sample 
who had not previously been contacted, and requested that they take 
another more substantial step.190 He asked them to place a large, 
poorly built, ugly "Drive Carefully" sign in their yard.191 Only 17 
percent of the control group agreed to let the researchers place the 
sign, but 76 percent of those who had first signed the supporting 
petition did.192 
Channel factors have also proven useful in explaining previously 
puzzling behavior. For example, Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett have 
proposed the following channel factor based explanation of Milgram's 
experiment on obedience.193 First, the subjects formed an implicit 
contract with Milgram to complete the project and agreed to a specific 
185. See id. at 132-33. 
186. See id. at 49. 
187. Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 71. 
188. Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-
in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195 (1966). 
189. Id. at 199. 
190. Id. at 200. 
191. Id. ("The subject was shown a picture of a very large sign reading 'Drive Carefully' 
placed in front of an attractive house. The picture was taken so that the sign obscured much 
of the front of the house and completely concealed the doorway. It was rather poorly 
lettered."). 
192 Id. at 201 tbl.2. 
193. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 56-58. 
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procedure without realizing their full ramifications. The first few 
shocks were small, perhaps even innocuous. It was only through a 
series of gradual steps that subjects were led to administer 
dangerously high levels of voltage. If the experimenter had 
immediately instructed them to give the highest shock possible - one 
clearly labeled dangerous - he would likely have been widely 
disobeyed.194 As one commentator has observed: 
It is easy to see that there must be a line; it is not so easy to see where 
that line ought to be. . . . [I]f the subject decides that giving the next 
shock is not permissible . . .  what was the justification for administering 
the last shock he just gave? . . .  The subject is trapped by his gradual 
involvement in the experiment.195 
Until the learner begins thumping on the wall or stops responding, 
there is no clear point at which the subject can justify stopping now, as 
opposed to at the previous shock.196 Consequently, it was at this point 
that most of the refusals to continue occurred.197 
Second, many of Milgram's subjects displayed a desire and intent 
to quit, but, in the absence of a channel factor through which that 
intent could be acted upon, most continued.198 Ross and Nisbett 
suggest imagining that there was also a button on the control panel 
that the subject was told he could press whenever he wished to 
terminate the experiment.199 They argue that this minor situational 
194. Cf Arnie Cann et al., Effects of Initial Request Size and Timing of a Second Request 
on Compliance: The Foot in the Door and the Door in the Face, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 774 (1975). Cann explored the effects of the onerousness of an initial request on 
the rate of acquiescence to a subsequent request. Cann asked one group of subjects to 
perform a relatively minimal task and then a task requiring an intermediate amount of time. 
He asked a second group of subjects to first perform a laborious task and then, after they 
responded, to perform the task requiring only an intermediate amount of time. Cann found 
that subjects in the second group were much less likely to comply. Id. at 777 tbl.2. 
195. JOHN SABINI & MAURY SILVERS, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 70 (?); see 
John Sabini et al., The Really Fundamental Attribution Error, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1 ,  3 
(2001). 
196. See also Sabini et al., supra note 195, at 3 (describing the "slippery slope" aspect of 
Milgram's experiment as "crucial"). 
197. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 56. 
198. Despite their high rate of compliance, many of Milgram's subjects appeared quite 
eager to quit. Many were extremely distraught by their actions and displayed extreme 
tension, nervous laughter, trembling, and stuttering. Milgram, Behavioral Study, supra note 
75, at 375. As one of Milgram's associates stated: 
I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and 
confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was 
rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and 
twisted his hands. At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered: "Oh God, 
let's stop it." And yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter, and 
obeyed to the end. 
Id. at 377 (quoting an observer). 
199. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 57. 
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change would drastically increase the number of subjects who refuse 
to continue by providing a simple exit from an uncomfortable, 
inducing situation.200 One channel factor is, therefore, the provision of 
a means of escaping an inducing situation. 
Third, Ross and Nisbett argue that the subjects were less likely to 
disobey the experimenter because the situation did not add up.201 
Although the subjects believed they were actually taking part in an 
experiment and actually administering severe shocks, the behavior of 
the experimenter was contrary to expectations. The experimenter did 
not express any concern about the safety of the learner or even check 
to make sure he was okay. In such a situation, where nothing makes 
sense, the subject may be less likely to act decisively or disavow role 
expectations. 202 
Milgram's follow-up study supports Ross and Nisbett's conclusion. 
Milgram repeated his experiment, but instead of requiring the teacher 
to incrementally increase the shock with each wrong answer, he 
allowed them to set any voltage level they wanted.203 Under those 
circumstances, only 2.5 percent of teachers administered the maximum 
shock.204 Milgram's original experiment was, therefore, not a 
particularly good measure of the teachers' disposition to inflict pain.205 
A typical government sting is akin to a test for criminal 
predisposition.206 When the suspect takes the bait and commits the 
crime, he has tested positive. When the suspect declines the 
opportunity, he tests negati-ie. A non-predisposed suspect who is 
induced into committing the crime is a "false-positive" and indicative 
of a failure in the sting's design. The desirability of a particular sting 
200. See id. 
201. Id. at 57-58. 
202. Consider one teacher's response during post-experiment questioning: 
My reactions were awfully peculiar. I don't know if you were watching me, but my reactions 
were giggly, and trying to stifle laughter. This isn't the way I usually am. This was a sheer 
reaction to a totally impossible situation. And my reaction was to the situation of having to 
hurt somebody. And being totally helpless and caught up in a set of circumstances where I 
just couldn't deviate and I couldn't try to help. 
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 54 (quoting a subject). 
203. Id. at 70-72. 
204. Id. at 60-61 tbl.3. 
205. Milgram, however, never completely abandoned the search for dispositional 
explanations for why some teachers obeyed and why others disobeyed. See id. app. II. But, 
without using the term "channel factors," he described the teachers as "integrated into a 
situation that carries its own momentum. The subject's problem then is how to become 
disengaged from a situation which is moving in an altogether ugly direction." Milgram, Some 
Conditions, supra note 75, at 73. 
206. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932) ("The appropriate object 
of [a sting operation] frequently essential to the enforcement of the Jaw, is to reveal the 
criminal design . . . .  "). 
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design is largely a function of the number of "true-positives" - i.e., 
predisposed criminals - it catches and how few false-positives it 
produces. The entrapment defense, by acquitting some of the false­
positives, is one way of discouraging the use of abusive sting 
operations and encouraging the police to more narrowly tailor their 
efforts. 
Channel factors are one method that can be used to minimize false 
positives.207 For example, providing the defendant with a clear 
opportunity to terminate a high-pressure police encounter may protect 
the innocent. As discussed above, Ross and Nisbett hypothesized that 
many of Milgram's teachers continued to shock learners for as long as 
they did because they did not perceive a clear means of exiting what 
was clearly an uncomfortable situation.208 The provision of an 
"experiment termination" button on the control panel likely would 
have substantially reduced the number of fully-compliant teachers.209 
Similarly, Milgram demonstrated that fewer teachers administered the 
shocks when the experimenter issued commands by telephone instead 
of face-to-face.210 Each of these measures would help, in Milgram's 
experiment, to distinguish those truly predisposed to aggressive 
behavior from the ordinary person. Because they provide a method of 
separating the ordinary person from the predisposed, I shall refer to 
these situational manipulations as "exculpating channel factors." 
The goal of narrowly-tailored sting operations is, however, in 
tension with police incentives to maximize the number of convictions 
and the length of sentences.211 The police may, in other words, create 
207. Another method of reducing false-positives is requmng the police to have 
reasonable suspicion that the target is engaged in or is preparing to engage in illegal activity 
before engaging in a sting operation. Teri L. Chambers, Note, United States v. Jacobson: A 
Call for Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity as a Threshold Limitation on 
Governmental Sting Operations, 44 ARK. L. REV. 493, 510 (1991); J. Gregory Deis, Note, 
Economics, Causation, and the Entrapment Defense, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1229 n.153; 
Jack B. Harrison, Note, The Government as Pornographer: Government Sting Operations 
and Entrapment: United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 
1535 (1992), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1088-94 (1993); Maura F.J. Whelan, Comment, Lead 
Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with 
a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1 193, 1216 (1985); Michael 0. 
Zabriskie, Comment, If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who Is the Next Target? - An 
Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 237-44 (1993). 
208. See supra Section l.D. 
209. The signs of severe stress that most subjects displayed suggest that, if given a clear 
opportunity to escape, most subjects would have taken it. See supra notes 198-205 and 
accompanying text. 
210. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 59-62. 
211. Cf PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 14 
(1965). Wall argues: 
identifications [of suspects] made by [eye-witness] policemen in highly competitive activities, 
such as undercover narcotic agents, whose chances for promotion may depend upon the 
number of arrests made because of their sales, should be scrutinized with special care. There 
is a danger that their identifications may be influenced unconsciously by their desire for 
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stings that maximize, rather than minimize, false-positives and 
encourage the already predisposed to commit more serious crimes 
than they otherwise would. One method of doing so is the use of what 
I will call "inculpating channel factors" - small situational changes 
that have the tendency to produce false-positives. The "foot-in-the­
door" technique," in which the police convince the defendant to 
commit some minor transgression in order to make him more 
agreeable to a larger scheme, is one such method especially prone to 
abuse.212 This could, for example, occur when a defendant is 
predisposed to sell small amounts of a drug, but not enough to qualify 
for a sufficiently substantial sentencing enhancement.213 An informant 
or undercover officer could exploit this lesser disposition by 
establishing a small-scale drug operation with the suspect and then 
applying pressure to increase the quantity traded until the defendant 
qualified for the more severe sentence.214 
Use of inculpating channel factors poses a peculiar threat to the 
entrapment defense precisely because they can sharply effect behavior 
in ways that factfinders find difficult to predict and account for. Either 
through ignorance of the effects of channel factors, or willful 
manipulation, the police can design sting operations that produce a 
large number of false-positives that an unwary judge or jury will have 
promotion. 
Id. at 14. 
212. See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text. 
213. Some courts have recognized a limited form of the defense known as "sentencing 
entrapment," which occurs when the defendant is induced, through "outrageous official 
conduct," to commit a more serious version of a crime than that to which he was 
predisposed. See United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1 1 16, 1 128 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993). Sentencing entrapment may occur, for example, 
when a defendant, seeking to make a small drug buy, is pressured into purchasing a larger 
amount by an undercover agent. The burden of establishing sentencing entrapment is on the 
defendant. United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996). A successful showing 
of sentencing entrapment does not result in acquittal, but merely a downward sentencing 
departure. See, e.g. , United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1 103, 1 108 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding 
sentencing entrapment and remanding for resentencing). The theory is not accepted by all 
the federal circuits, see United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 818 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the 
theory of sentencing entrapment), and has been rejected by most state courts that have 
considered the issue. See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 821 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002); State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Hardy, 715 
So. 2d 466, 472 (La. 1998); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 659 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass. 1996). But 
see Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987, 989-90 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (adopting the theory); 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 760 A.2d 33, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (adopting same). 
214. See Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). In Leech, the defendant 
operated a small-scale methamphetamine operation with a government informant. Id. at 989. 
Their usual course of dealing was that the informant would borrow money from the 
defendant, which he would repay in small quantities of methamphetamine. Id. at 995 
(Chapel, J., dissenting). On one occasion, the informant offered the defendant a quantity of 
methamphetamine worth 28 times the value of the debt as repayment. Id. at 995 n.31 
(Chapel, J., dissenting). This amount also qualified the defendant for the more serious 
charge of trafficking. Id. at 995 (Chapel, J., dissenting). 
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difficulty separating from true-positives. Prosecutors, facing similar 
incentives to achieve convictions and lengthy sentences, and suffering 
from the same cognitive biases as factfinders, may not always be relied 
upon to refuse to prosecute a defendant snared in a heavy-handed 
sting.21s 
The dangers that inculpating channel factors pose for the 
entrapment defense is illustrated by the First Circuit's decision in 
United States v. Connell.216 In that case, an undercover agent arranged 
with a stockbroker, Connell, to launder money from a gambling 
operation in a series of transactions.217 During the fourth transaction, 
the agent informed Connell that the money was actually derived from 
the illegal drug trade.218 Knowledge or belief that the money being 
laundered was criminally derived carried with it a much stiffer 
sentence than laundering for other purposes, but the enhancement 
only applied when the defendant actually believed that the money was 
criminally derived, not when he "reasonably should have believed. "219 
The purpose for the agent's deception was solely to expose Connell to 
a stiffer sentence. Accordingly, Connell argued that the sentencing 
enhancement should not apply because, although he was not 
entrapped into laundering money generally, he was entrapped into 
laundering money that he believed to be criminally derived.220 
The police in Connell employed Freedman and Fraser's classic 
"foot-in-the-door" technique to ratchet up the severity of Connell's 
215. One commentator observed after interviewing prosecutors: 
In the extraordinary case where a possible (entrapment) defense is present . . .  defense 
counsel will visit the prosecutor and argue that the charges should be dropped because the 
defendant was entrapped. The prosecutors never accede to this plea because of the lack of 
appeal the defense has to their sense of oughtness, because of their perception of their role 
in the criminal process, and because of their private ambitions. 
It might be suspected that the resistance could be said to stem simply from the fact that 
"the law is on our side." But the prosecutors were found to have a distinct attitude toward 
the "entrapped defendant" in a narcotics sale case. They felt that his only excuse was faulty 
police methods, not a violation of the "letter" of the law, and the seriousness of his crime 
showed that he was not "innocent." While they all felt that the facts in Toler should have 
constituted entrapment, they all agreed that they would not have refused to prosecute the 
case unless it was shown "that the police officer twisted his [the defendant's] arm." 
Bancroft, supra note 21,  at 161 (footnote omitted). People v. Toler held that the defendant 
was not entrapped where the undercover agent requested drugs from him more than twenty 
times before he succumbed, and when the agent appealed to the defendant's sympathy by 
telling him the drugs were for a terminally ill narcotics addict. 185 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. 1962). 
Bancroft concluded that "the defense of entrapment never triggers the decision not to 
prosecute." Bancroft, supra note 21, at 162 (emphasis added). 
216. 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992). 
217. Id. at 193. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 195 n.7. 
220. Id. at 194. 
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sentence.221 The police and Com1ell agreed to a crime that Connell was 
predisposed to - laundering non-drug derived money. By exposing 
himself to this degree of criminal liability, he became personally 
invested in the criminal enterprise. The subsequent request to launder 
drug money was - other than the money's origin - a request that 
differed only in degree but not in kind. 
A comparison to Milgram's teachers is illustrative. Both Connell 
and the teachers agreed to an initial set of procedures.222 In Connell's 
case, it was money laundering for a non-criminal enterprise.223 
Although this act was illegal, it does not compel a conclusion that he 
was predisposed to launder money for drug dealers, but neither 
Milgram's teachers nor Connell realized the scope of the procedures 
to which they had agreed. Both Milgram's teachers and Connell 
engaged in a series of steps in furtherance of the arrangement and 
then were presented with a critical juncture. For the teachers, it was 
the learner banging on the wall and ceasing to respond to questions; 
for Connell, it was being told that he had become part of a major drug 
operation.224 Presumably, the police believed that Connell was less 
likely to agree to launder money for a drug operation; that is why they 
waited until he had conducted three illegal transactions before telling 
him. Similarly, Milgram knew that teacher obedience would be 
substantially reduced if he asked them to start off giving the highest 
level of shock to a protesting learner. And neither the teachers nor 
Connell were provided with an exculpating channel factor. It seems 
unlikely that a stock broker, when confronted with the fact that he is 
laundering money for a ring of drug dealers, would feel free to call the 
arrangement off in the absence of a clear escape route. Similarly, 
Milgram's subjects were incapable of putting their generalized desire 
to quit administering shocks into action in the absence of a clear 
means of acting on it. 
The court rejected Connell's sentencing entrapment argument, 
reasoning: 
221. See supra Section l.D. 
222. Compare Connell, 960 F.2d at 193 (describing the procedures that Connell and the 
police agreed upon for their money laundering operation), with Milgram, Behavioral Study, 
supra note 75, at 373 (describing the procedure for Milgram's experiment to which the 
subjects agreed). 
223. Connell, 960 F.2d at 193 ("During their first meeting, [the undercover agent] told 
Connell that the money was coming from an elaborate gambling operation in Atlantic City 
(whether legal or illegal, [the agent] did not specify) ."). 
Id. 
224. Id. at 194. 
[Connell] contends that the vice lay in the timing: by broaching the subject of the currency's 
supposed origin (drug trafficking) only after Connell had fully completed three episodes of 
money laundering, the undercover agent forced (or lured) him into actions he would 
otherwise have eschewed, i.e., peripheral participation in the narcotics trade. 
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By their nature, sting operations are designed to tempt the criminally 
inclined, and a well-constructed sting is often sculpted to test the limits of 
the target's criminal inclinations. Courts should go very slowly before 
staking out rules that will deter government agents from the proper 
performance of their investigative duties.225 
To the contrary, because a sting operation is intended to merely 
produce a temporal displacement of crime - causing its commission 
at a time when the police can catch the defendant - a well-designed 
sting operation should not strive to push the defendant beyond the 
limits he would have faced in his natural environment. " [T]est[ing] the 
limits of the target's criminal inclinations"226 when he would not have 
been so tested otherwise is to engage in the inefficient, sterile activity 
of first inciting crime and then punishing, which the entrapment 
defense was meant to prevent.227 As Milgram's experiment proves, 
most people have some potential to commit frightening, criminal 
acts.228 In response to adept manipulation of channel factors, the 
ordinary person may commit criminal acts well beyond what would 
ordinarily be expected. If the channel factor is subtle enough, the 
police conduct can dramatically affect behavior while never 
approaching what a judge is likely to perceive as sufficiently egregious 
to warrant a sentencing entrapment defense. 
It is impossible to know how Connell would have behaved under a 
more narrowly tailored sting operation. Whether he would have 
declined to launder drug money if it had been the first request that the 
undercover agent had made, or whether he would have quit had he 
been told he could, is speculation. Whichever the case, the Connell 
court's statement that "we find no grounds for concern in the 
circumstances at bar"229 displays a troubling lack of consideration of 
both how the police can use situational variables to sculpt a 
defendant's behavior, and how a tailored sting operation could be 
conducted to minimize false positives.23° Closer attention in future 
cases to whether the government took efforts to offer - or steps to 
225. Id. at 196. 
226. Id. 
227. See United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (arguing that one purpose of the entrapment defense is to prevent wasting law 
enforcement resources by instigating crime that would not otherwise occur). 
228. Had the learner in fact been shocked, many versions of Milgram's experiment 
would have required the teacher to commit criminal acts. See, e.g. , MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE 
TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 3-4 (describing experiment and fact that, under some 
variations, the learner demanded to be released and the teacher was required to forcibly 
place the learner's hand on a shock plate). 
229. Connell, 960 F.2d at 196. 
230. The FBI, for example, has promulgated guidelines that instruct agents to model 
undercover operations on the real world as closely as they can. MARX, supra note 105, 
at 182. 
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avoid offering - exculpating channel factors could focus judicial 
scrutiny on the situational nuance that police officers potentially 
exploit. 
II. SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
This Note has argued that the fundamental attribution error 
produces factfinding inaccuracies that diminish the ability of the 
entrapment defense to exculpate the unwary innocent and serve as a 
meaningful check on police overreaching. In addition, systematic 
biases in factfinding are ripe for exploitation by overzealous law 
enforcement who could, for example, tailor sting operations to 
maximize the number of unpredisposed targets who commit the 
offense, thereby maximizing arrests, convictions, and sentences at the 
expense of accuracy. 
This Part proposes three modest reforms that might remedy some 
of the dangers the fundamental attribution error poses for the 
entrapment defense. First, it argues that the objective test should be 
adopted as a question of fact for the jury. Second, it proposes that, at a 
minimum, some additional instruction to the jury can attenuate some 
of the effects of the fundamental attribution error. Finally, it suggests 
that the failure of the police to provide exculpating channel factors 
and the inclusion of inculpating channel factors in the design of sting 
operations should be looked upon with greater suspicion by the courts. 
A. An Objective Test Decided by a Jury 
The subjective test for entrapment, as applied in the federal courts, 
classifies both predisposition and inducement as questions of fact for 
the jury. The objective test in most jurisdictions differs in two regards. 
First, the objective test is applied by a judge, not a jury.231 Second, it 
focuses solely on the degree of inducement offered by the police, not 
the defendant's predisposition.232 Common reasons for preferring that 
the judge decide the issue are that he is better qualified to set 
standards for future police conduct,233 jury verdicts give little future 
guidance for sting operations,234 the judge is less likely to be swayed by 
231. The question-of-law approach has been articulated in the Supreme Court by Justice 
Roberts, concurring in Sorrels v. United States. 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., 
concurring) ("It is the province of the court and the court alone to protect itself and the 
government from such prostitution of the criminal law . . . .  Proof of entrapment, at any stage 
of the case, requires the court to stop the prosecution, direct that the indictment be quashed, 
and the defendant set at liberty."). 
232. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (2003); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962). 
233. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 189. 
234. Judge Traynor, for example, has stated: 
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otherwise-inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts, or that "evidence 
pertaining to guilt is likely to infect a jury determination."235 
This Section takes a different, somewhat unconventional 
approach,236 adopting some of the arguments others have made in 
favor of the objective test, but contending that the jury should apply it, 
not a judge. First, entrapment should be a question for the jury, which 
is more likely to engage in group discussion, an activity that has been 
shown to attenuate the effects of the fundamental attribution error. 
Second, the jury should apply the objective standard because it 
eliminates the focus on the defendant's predisposition, the inquiry 
most influenced by a dispositional bias and the use of otherwise­
inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts.237 
1. The Benefits of Jury Discussion 
The proper division of labor between the judge and jury has been 
the source of extensive contemporary debate.238 I do not seek to 
A jury verdict of guilty or not guilty tells the police nothing about the jury's evaluation of the 
police conduct. A verdict of guilty may mean that the jury did not believe the defendant's 
testimony that would have established entrapment. It may also mean that the jury did not 
believe that the conduct created a substantial risk of inducing one not ready to commit the 
offense into doing so. 
People v. Moran, 463 P.2d 763, 769 (Cal. 1970) (Traynor, CJ., dissenting). 
235. People v. D'Angelo, 257 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Mich. 1977). 
236. See, e.g. , WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.3(b) (stating that 
"it is not entirely clear why [the objective test should be a jury question]"); Myron 
Moskovitz, You Can't Tell a Book by Its Title, 8 CRIM. L.F. 125, 134-35 (1997) ("I can't see 
why entrapment should ever be decided by a jury.") (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, 
VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1996)); Laura 
Gardner Webster, Building a Better Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Theory 
from Sorrells to Mathews, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 605, 630 (1990) (describing the "breathtaking 
naivete" with which the Supreme Court allows the jury to decide entrapment). 
237. It should be cautioned, however, that although a jury-determined objective test 
may improve the accuracy of factfinding, juries may have more difficulty understanding the 
law of the objective test than the subjective test. See Eugene Borgida & Roger Park, The 
Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 
19 (1988) (arguing that juror comprehension of the objective standard was lower than that of 
the subjective standard). This, however, may be the result not of any inherent conceptual 
complexity within the objective standard, but with overly confusing ways of explaining it in 
jury instructions. See id. at 35-36 & n.15. Subjects in psychological studies, for example, do 
not seem to have difficulty understanding what it means to predict what an "average person" 
will do in a given situation. But it is unsurprising that a j uror might not understand what it 
means to determine what a "hypothetical, law-abiding, non-predisposed, reasonable person" 
would do in response to police pressure. The problem with juror comprehension of the 
objective test may not lie, therefore, in the form of the test, but in the form of the 
instruction. 
238. On the question of whether the judge or jury is a better factfinder, see Ellsworth, 
supra note 169, at 217-18; Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock 
after Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert Litan ed., 
1993); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about 
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 
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resolve the dispute, but instead wish to suggest one reason for 
preferring that juries resolve the issue of entrapment: juries enjoy the 
benefit of group discussion. 
A series of studies suggests that the process of deliberation and 
discussion ameliorates the effects of the fundamental attribution error. 
In one study, Edward Wright and Gary Wells replicated a scenario 
very similar to Jones and Harris's study of the readers of pro- and anti­
Castro essays.239 That is, all subjects read essays arguing a particular 
position. One half of the readers were told the writer was assigned his 
editorial position, while the other half were told that he chose it.240 
Wright and Wells also divided the readers of the essays into four 
groups: those who would immediately answer questions about the 
essay's author after reading it, those who would answer the questions 
after a ten minute delay, those who were given a ten minute delay and 
told they would discuss their answers with a group after answering, 
and those who were actually given ten minutes to discuss the questions 
with a group before answering.241 
The results indicated that group discussion substantially reduced 
the impact of the fundamental attribution error.242 Those subjects who 
engaged in group discussion were much less likely to erroneously 
discern the author's dispositional traits from the editorial position of 
an essay that he had no choice in deciding.243 Neither anticipating that 
one would engage in group discussion after answering the 
questionnaire nor having an additional ten minutes to think about the 
questionnaire before answering had a significant effect.244 Those who 
participated in group discussion were much less likely to draw 
dispositional inferences from situationally constrained behavior, but 
Wright and Wells were not able to provide a definitive explanation of 
(Robert Litan ed., 1993); see also United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that 
the mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment 
due to judicial factfinding); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (holding that the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose is based on the facts admitted by the defendant or 
found by a jury, not the judge). 
239. Edward F. Wright & Gary L. Wells, Does Group Discussion Attenuate the 
Dispositional Bias?, 15 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 531 (1985). Wells, however, instructed 
the authors to write about whether a portion of Canada should secede. Id. at 535. 
240. Id. at 536-37. 
241. Id. at 536. 
242 Id. at 542 ("The tendency of perceivers to make dispositionally-biased attributions 
for behavior performed under constraint was not only reduced, but eliminated, when 
attributors were instructed to render their judgment after a group discussion of the critical 
attribution question."). 
243. Id. at 540 tbl.1. Recall that because the readers were told that the editorial position 
of the essay was assigned to the writer and not of his own volition, it was logically irrelevant 
to the writer's actual opinion. 
244. Id. 
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the phenomenon.245 Subsequent studies have confirmed the value of 
group discussion in making dispositional attributions.246 
A plausible explanation for the benefits of group discussion may 
be found in the overconfidence studies of David Dunning.247 Recall 
that when Dunning forced subjects to write essays providing multiple 
interpretations of an ambiguous set of facts, the effects of the 
fundamental attribution error were reduced. Subjects were less likely 
to infer dispositional traits from situationally constrained behavior, 
and they were less likely to be overconfident. The act of writing essays 
in Dunning's experiment may have had the same effect as the group 
discussion in the Wells and Wright experiment. Just as writing essays 
providing alternate construals of an ambiguous situation forced 
Dunning's subjects to confront the uncertainty of their initial 
assessment of the facts, so might discussing those facts with a diverse 
group of strangers with unique perspectives. Although this may not 
result in a complete revision of their interpretation, it reminds jurors 
that their construal of the facts is not always the only reasonable 
one.24s 
The work of Wells, Wright, and Dunning therefore provides an 
overlooked reason to allow the jury to decide the question of 
entrapment, as it commonly does under the subjective test. The 
objective test as it is commonly applied, is flawed in that it views the 
entrapment inquiry as exclusively a question of law for the judge.249 
There is, however, no guarantee that a judge would engage in 
fundamental-attribution-error-attenuating group discussion. Indeed, 
unless one of her law clerks observed all of the relevant testimony, 
there is no one with whom she could effectively do so. Those 
jurisdictions that reserve the entrapment inquiry for the judge 
abandon the best-known method of reducing the effects of the 
fundamental attribution error: discussion.250 
245. Id. at 544. 
246. See Gwen M. Wittenbaum & Garold Stasser, The Role of Prior Expectancy and 
Group Discussion in the Attribution of Attitudes, 31 1. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 82 
(1995). As encouraging as these studies are, the benefits of group discussion do not eliminate 
the effects of the fundamental attribution error, especially when the inquiry is one of 
judgment, without a demonstrably correct answer. Id. at 102. 
247. See supra Section l.C. 
248. See Ellsworth, supra note 169, at 206 ("If it does nothing else, group 
deliberation . . .  forces people to realize that there are different ways of interpreting the 
same facts . . . .  A judge does not have this vivid reminder that alternative construals are 
possible."). The adversary process by itself may by itself encourage the consideration of 
multiple construals, but more research is needed to determine to what extent. 
249. See, e.g., State v. Valdez-Molina, 897 P.2d 993, 995 (Idaho 1995); People v. 
D'Angelo, 257 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Mich. 1977). 
250. This is not to suggest either that the average judge is worse than the average Ione 
juror. or that the exceptional judge might not be less prone to the fundamental attribution 
error than the average jury. Indeed, studies have shown that certain individuals who score 
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2. The Benefits of the Objective Test 
The objective test is preferable on two grounds related to the 
accuracy of factfinding. First, because it focuses solely on the inducing 
effects of the police conduct, while abandoning any inquiry into the 
defendant's predisposition, it eliminates the element of the subjective 
test that is most susceptible to bias by the fundamental attribution 
error. Second, because the disposition of the defendant is no longer 
relevant, there is no need to admit prejudicial character and bad-acts 
evidence.251 
Studies suggest that the effects that the fundamental attribution 
error has on the predisposition inquiry are more pervasive and more 
difficult to remedy. In one illuminating experiment, Gtinter 
Bierbrauer demonstrated that subjects placed under certain conditions 
are better able to predict the behavior of the ordinary "teacher" in 
Milgram's experiment.252 Bierbrauer recreated Milgram's experiment, 
and allowed subjects to observe one teacher administer the entire 
sequence of shocks.253 After witnessing the experiment, subjects were 
asked to assess both the inducing effect of the experiment and to make 
dispositional attributions to the particular teacher they observed.254 
Specifically, they were required to predict the percentage of teachers 
who would refuse to continue at various shock levels, and the highest 
level of shock that the subject himself, his best friend, the learner, and 
the average Stanford student would administer if they were the 
teacher.255 They were then asked to rate the teacher they had just 
observed on four personality traits and predict his behavior in five 
hypothetical situations.256 One-third of Bierbrauer's subjects were 
required to answer these questions immediately after witnessing the 
well on the "Attributional Complexity Scale," see Garth J.O. Fletcher et al., Attributional 
Complexity: An Individual Differences Measure, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 875 
(1986), are less prone to the fundamental attribution error. See Devine, supra note 174. 
One possible compromise solution would be to give the defendant the option of trying 
the question of entrapment to a jury at trial, or to a judge before trial. Cf State v. Grilli, 230 
N.W.2d 445, 455 (Minn. 1975) (applying a subjective entrapment theory and granting the 
defendant the option to present the defense to either a judge in a pre-trial hearing, or a jury 
at trial). 
251. See FED. R. Evm. 404 (prohibiting the use of character evidence and evidence of 
other crimes "to show action in conformity therewith," but allowing admission for other 
purposes, such as proving predisposition). 
252. Giinter Bierbrauer, Why Did He Do It? Attribution of Obedience and the 
Phenomenon of Dispositional Bias, 9 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 67, 73 tbl .1  (1979). 
253. Id. at 71.  
254. Id. at 72. 
255. Id. at 72. 
256. Id. at 72-73. The hypothetical situations involved the teacher "making decisions 
involving adaptability, life-rescuing, compliance, cheating, and personal interference." Id. 
at 73. 
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experiment, one-third were required to play a number of games for 
thirty minutes before answering, and one-third were instructed to 
write and think about the experiment for thirty minutes before 
answering. 257 
The results revealed that delaying the subjects' responses 
improved their perception of situational control. Those subjects who 
were instructed to write and think about the experiment performed 
the best, predicting that the average student would administer a higher 
maximum shock and that a smaller percentage would disobey.258 
Although delayed-response subjects still predicted higher rates of 
disobedience than Milgram demonstrated, time for contemplation 
drastically improved the subjects' assessment of how the average 
person would perform in Milgram's experiment.259 Thinking about 
situational constraints, in other words, increased the accuracy of the 
subjects' assessment of the inducing effects of Milgram's experiment. 
Bierbrauer's subjects, however, did not seem to benefit from 
contemplation when it came to inquiries into what more closely 
resembled predisposition. Subjects in all three groups drew strong 
dispositional inferences about the teacher they witnessed, and they 
were willing to make strong predictions about his future behavior in 
hypothetical situations.260 There was no statistically significant 
difference in this regard between the three groups.261 Bierbrauer 
concluded that "opportunity to contemplate the witnessed behaviour 
does not decrease dispositional attribution."262 This suggests that the 
process of deliberation may increase the accuracy of the inducement 
inquiry (what the ordinary person will do) somewhat, but fails to 
increase the accuracy of the predisposition inquiry (what qualities the 
defendant has or whether he is likely to break the law absent police 
persuasion). 
The effects of the fundamental attribution error might be further 
attenuated by instruction that encourages additional deliberation. 
Merely anticipating future discussion does not seem to provide the 
same benefits as the actual process of group discussion.263 
Approximately one-half of all juries begin their deliberations with a 
vote.264 In addition to the danger that an opening vote will commit 
257. Id. at 71. 
258. Id. at 73 tbl.l. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 75-76. 
262. Id. at 76. 
263. Wright & Wells, supra note 239, at 542. 
264. Ellsworth, supra note 169, at 214. 
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jurors to their initial position too early, the jury might also achieve 
discussion-obviating unanimity. Because the amount of dialogue 
required to substantially diminish the impact of the fundamental 
attribution error is quite small, measures that encourage at least a 
minimal period of discussion, such as discouraging the jury from 
beginning deliberation with a vote, are a virtually costless method of 
increasing jury accuracy. 265 
The second and more obvious benefit from eliminating the 
predisposition element is that the defendant's predisposition is no 
longer relevant, thereby eliminating the need to introduce prejudicial 
character evidence.266 When courts apply the subjective test for 
entrapment, they routinely admit evidence relevant to the defendant's 
predisposition that would, under normal circumstances, be excluded as 
impermissible character evidence, such as evidence of the defendant's 
prior bad acts.267 Introduction of such evidence invites the jury to 
convict the defendant based upon her prior, uncharged conduct.268 
Adoption of the objective test eliminates this danger. 
B. Closing Arguments 
The easiest, least expensive, and least objectionable partial remedy 
for these problems is a more fully informed jury. The factfinding 
accuracy of the jury may be improved through a variety of techniques. 
It may, for example, help if jurors are encouraged to generate multiple 
situational construals of the evidence. 
Closing arguments may also suggest that the jurors imagine 
themselves in the defendant's situation. Studies suggest that 
experiencing the situational constraints a subject was under when she 
acted tends to mitigate the effects of the fundamental attribution 
error. In their experiment on attitude attribution from pro- and anti­
Castro essays, Jones and Harris discovered that one way they could 
reduce their subjects' likelihood of drawing unwarranted inferences 
was by requiring them to write their own assigned-position pro- or 
265. See Wright & Wells, supra note 239, at 542 (concluding that increased decision time 
did not further the disposition-attenuating effects of discussion so long as some discussion 
occurred). 
266. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
267. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (stating that "if the 
defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate 
and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue"). 
268. D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of 
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 325 (1989) 
("[E]vidence of uncharged misconduct can lead a jury to convict an accused, even if guilt of 
the charged offense has not been clearly demonstrated, because the accused has been shown 
either to be a person deserving of punishment for bad character or to be guilty of other sins 
for which the accused has never been punished."). 
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anti-Castro essay before judging the disposition of other authors.269 
When the salience of the situational constraint was increased, the 
subjects were more hesitant to assume the disposition of others 
similarly situated.270 This, others have argued, is because actors are 
much more likely to see their actions as situationally constrained.271 
The actor's attention is focused outward on situational cues, rather 
than inward on her own behavior, but for the observer, the focal 
stimulus is the actor himself.272 
The nature of the adversarial process already provides a 
substantial opportunity to present alternative interpretations of the 
facts surrounding the commission of an offense. This effect can be 
amplified by jury instruction or defense closing argument that 
encourages the jury to imagine themselves in the role of the defendant 
and how the juror would have explained the causes of her behavior in 
that situation. If the jurors are asked to imagine themselves in the 
defendant's position, it may help them to appreciate the situational 
pressures she was under.273 
269. See Jones & Harris, supra note 34, at 10 tbl.2; see also Sheldon Ungar & Aysan 
Sev'er, "Say It Ain't So, Ben ": Attributions for a Fallen Hero, 52 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 207 
(1989) (hypothesizing and finding evidence for the proposition that when subjects identify 
with an actor, and the actor does something disreputable, they are more likely to attribute 
his behavior to situational factors). 
270. See Jones & Harris, supra note 34, at 12 ("When the prediction task was preceded 
by the task of writing a pro-Castro speech under directions, the correlation vanishes. Having 
to write a speech against one's own position seems to reduce the significance of that position 
when it comes to imputing the attitude of a target person operating under the same 
prescription."). This effect has been replicated when subjects are forced to observe their own 
behavior from a third-person perspective, for example through a videotape of their actions. 
See Michael D. Storms, Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and 
Observers' Points of View, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (1973). 
271. Jones & Nisbett, supra note 35. 
272. Id. at 7. For a recent recreation and expansion of the Jones & Harris study, see 
Shiri Nussbaum et al., Creeping Dispositionism: The Temporal Dynamics of Behavior 
Prediction, 84 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 485 (2003). 
273. It may be argued that this would be a prohibited "golden rule" argument, which 
asks jurors to place themselves in the position of one of the parties. See, e.g., State v. 
McHenry, 78 P.3d 403, 410 (Kan. 2003); Forbes v. State, 771 So.2d 942, 950 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2000); Gomez v. State, 751 So.2d 630, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); King v. State, 877 
S.W.2d 583, 586 (Ark. 1994); Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 640 (Miss. 1988). The rationale 
for the prohibition is that such an argument, by in effect asking jurors to "do unto" one of 
the parties what they would have that party "do unto them," encourages the jury to depart 
from neutrality. Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1982). The 
prohibition on golden rule arguments does not, however, apply when used to ask the jury to 
assess the reasonableness of a party's actions. See Cummins Ala., Inc., v. Allbritten, 548 
So.2d 258, 263 (Fla. Dist. App. 1989) (allowing a golden rule argument in a negligence case 
which asked what precautions the jurors, as reasonable people, would have taken). Golden­
rule-type jury instructions are also given when a defendant pleads self-defense, which 
requires the jury to assess the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of bodily harm. See, 
e.g., Hood v. State, 27 So. 643, 644 (Miss. 1900) (finding reversible error where trial court 
refused a proposed self-defense jury instruction containing the statement, "[t]he jury must 
put themselves, as far as possible, in the defendant Hood's place, and then judge whether the 
danger was apparent"); 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIM. 411 .35 § 2 (2002) ("In deciding 
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C. Consideration of Inculpating and Exculpating Channel Factors in 
Motions for a Ftnding of Entrapment as a Matter of Law 
The consideration of channel factors provides one valuable 
technique for deciding whether entrapment has been established as a 
matter of law. In particular, judges can inform themselves of 
commonly used inculpating and exculpating channel factors, and use 
that knowledge when deciding whether to allow the question of 
inducement to go to the jury. Should a judge identify the use of 
inculpating channel factors, the question of inducement should be 
given to the jury only with hesitancy. If, however, the police provided 
an exculpating channel factor, a judge can be confident that 
inducement is appropriately a question for the jury. 
The Supreme Court hinted at such an approach in Masciale v. 
United States.214 In Masciale, the defendant was convicted of selling 
heroin to an undercover police officer. 275 In declining to find 
inducement as a matter of law, the Court noted that the undercover 
officer "immediately made it clear that he wanted to talk about buying 
large quantities of high-grade narcotics and that if [the defendant] 
were not interested, the conversation would end at once."276 The 
police, in other words, provided an exculpating channel factor that an 
ordinary person would readily utilize to escape from inducing police 
conduct, and a jury could therefore reasonably infer that the 
defendant was not induced. 
A judge should conversely weigh in the defendant's favor the use 
by the police of the sorts of inculpating channel factors seen in 
Connell.211 The most common is the foot-in-the-door technique, which 
should be especially considered when the defendant pleads sentencing 
entrapment. The foot-in-the-door technique actually consists of two 
independent channel factors. First, the defendant is convinced to 
commit a minor offense. Second, much like a skilled salesman, the 
police provide him with no clear means of extricating himself. 
Although these appear to be the two most common inculpating 
channel factors, social psychologists have identified a variety of other 
whether (the defendant) . . .  had reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief that 
he/she was in (imminent) (immediate) danger . . .  you must put yourself in the position of 
(the defendant) . . . .  ") ; TEX. CRIM. JURY CHARGES 12:1100.120 (1999) ("[Y]ou should place 
yourselves in the position of the defendant at the time in question and view the 
circumstances from his viewpoint alone."). The inducement element of an entrapment 
defense similarly requires the jury to assess how a reasonable person would respond to 
police pressure, and a golden-rule-type argument should be similarly permissible. 
274. 356 U.S. 386 (1958). 
275. Masciale, 356 U.S. 386 (1958). 
276. Id. at 387. 
277. United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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means of subtly altering behavior including efforts to confuse the 
defendant by placing him in a situation in which ordinary expectations 
are contradicted278 and providing the defendant with a "role model" 
who commits the offense first and receives a benefit.279 Further 
research is needed to identify other inculpating and exculpating 
channel factors that may be used in sting operations. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the fundamental attribution error 
distorts the factual inquiries involved in an entrapment defense. This 
persistent dispositional bias makes factfinders especially prone to 
attribute criminal conduct to the character traits of the defendant, and 
not to situational manipulations by the police. The fundamental 
attribution error also produces exceptionally overconfident causal 
attributions, which deprives the defendant of some of the benefit of 
the reasonable doubt. The Note has also made three suggestions for 
reform. First, the objective test for entrapment should be adopted as a 
question for the jury. Second, the jury should be instructed in a way 
that promotes deliberation. Finally, when evaluating entrapment 
claims, judges should scrutinize the sting operation for appropriate use 
of channel factors. 
278. See discussion supra notes 201-202 and accompanying tex_t. 
279. See James H. Bryan & Mary Ann Test, Models and Helping: Naturalistic Studies in 
Aiding Behavior, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 400 (1967). 
